What is Philosophy

Q of Phil
1) only possible late in life? [1-2]
2) Had the Answer All Along
   i) "the art of forming, investing, and fabricating concepts"
   ii) involves 'conceptual personae' (see fn on trans)
       a) ex: 'friends' in Greek phil
       b) diff btwn sage and philosopher [sage: Figures, phil:
concepts] [3]
   c) OR, agon: "the rivalry of free men" [4]
      i) CP of friend, lover, claimant, rival = diff
   d) OR, Blanchot's friend
      i) collective emergence from catastrophe [5]
      ii) shared a priori characteristics
          a) turning away, tiredness, distress,
       distrust/infinitive patience
      iii) phil "is not a simple art of forming, investing, or
fabricating concepts"
          a) b/c, not necessarily forms, discoveries, or products
          b) _creating_ concepts
          c) "create concepts that are always new"
          d) "science, arts and philosophies are all equally
creative"
          e) "concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like
heavenly bodies. There is no heaven for concepts." - then Nietzsche quote
   iv) must learn distrust of concepts [6]
      a) distrust most those concepts not created Self
      b) against Plato
3) Phil NOT
   i) contemplation, reflection, communication
   ii) contemplations: "are things as seen in the creation of their
specific concepts"
   iii) reflection: "no one needs phil to reflect on anything. ... it
loses everything ... it is a bad joke to say that this make them phil"
   iv) comm: "works under the sway of opinions in order to create
"consensus" not concepts"
      -"The idea of a Western democratic conversation between
friends has never produced a single concept." Greeks are a little
better...
   v) "The Universals of contemplation, and then of reflection, are
like two illusions through which philosophy has already passed in its dream
of dominating the other disciplines (objective idealism and subjective
idealism)" [6-7]
   vi) Universal of comm = imaginary masters of markets and media
(intersubjective idealism) [7]
vii) RATHER: "Every creation is singular, and the concept of a specifically philosophical creation is always a singularity"

"The first principle of philosophy is that Universal explain nothing but must themselves be explained"

4) def II: "knowledge through pure concepts" [7]
   a) NOT: know oneself, learn to think, act as if nothing were self-evident, etc
   b) Nietzschean verdict "you will know nothing through concepts unless you have first created them - that is, constructed them in an intuition specific to them: a field, a plane, and a ground that must not be confused with them but that shelters their seeds and the personae who cultivate them"

5) concepts
   a) must remain signed [Aristotle's substance, D's cogito, etc]
   b) name of Cs: sometime shockingly different, sometime common
   c) section transformations of concepts

"exclusive right of concept creation secures a function for philosophy, but it does not give it any preeminence or privilege since there are other ways of thinking and creating, other modes of ideation that, like scientific thought, do not have to pass through concepts" [8]

"we always come back to the question of the use of this activity of creating concepts, in its difference from scientific or artistic activity."

**"to say that the greatness of philosophy lies precise in its not having any use is a frivolous answer that not even young people find amusing anymore" [9]

d) Greek origins, agon, simulacrum

e) contemporary problems: [10]
   i) human sciences: sociology, epistemology, linguistics, psych
   ii)comp sci, marketing, design, ad, discipl of communication

-f) not yet sufficiently addressed
   i) phil think know/rep can be expl by the faculties able to form it (abstraction or generalization)
   ii) or employ it (judgment)
   ii) but concept isn't given but created

g) concept as "self-positioning" positions itself in itself
   i) post-Kantians as 'universal encyclopedia of the concept'
   -made concept creation a pure subjectivity
   ii) alt: a pedagogy of the concept
   -"analyze the conditions of creation as factors of always
singular moments

--if the three ages of the concept are:
i) encyclopedia
ii) pedagogy
iii) commercial professional training
*only the 2nd can safeguard us from falling from the heights of the 1st into the disaster of the 3rd "an absolute disaster for thought whatever its benefits might be, of course, from the viewpoint of universal capitalism"

Part 1: Philosophy

1. What is a Concept? [15]

-No simple concepts
-Sum of all components = chaos "pure and simple"

-concept has components as is defined by them *** (always more than 1 compo "every concept is at least double or triple, etc.")
-it has a combination [chiffre]
-is a multiplicity (but not all multiplicities are conceptual)
-not about beginnings, and if it serves as one, only in combination w/ view/ground [une raison]

Mediation non-universal [v/v perspectivalism]
-Even so-called universals as ultimate concepts must escape the chaos by circumscribing a universe that explains them (contemplation, reflection, communication)

On Totality
"every concept has a contour defined by the sum of its components"
"concept being a matter of articulation, of cutting and cross-cutting" [16]
"the concept is a whole because it totalizes its components, but it a fragmentary whole. Only on this condition can it escape the mental chaos constantly threatening it, stalking it, trying to reabsorb it."

Not a universal subjectivism [16]

Problematics:
"All concepts are connected to problems without which they would have no meaning and which can themselves only be isolated or understand as their solution emerges."

Founded on "there is" - problem of "the Other Person"
"Let us proceed in a summary fashion: we will consider a field of
experience taken as a real world no longer in relation to a self but to a simple "there is."" [17]
-a concept of the other that presupposes no more than the determination of a sensory world as condition. On this condition, the other appears as the expression of a possible.

three moments make it:
1) "the other" appears as "a possible world"
2) which exists in its expression of a (frightened) face
3) then has a specific reality when the expressing face speaks and says "I am frightened" [real language or speech]

-Leibniz, monad as expression of possible worlds

History
"Every concept has a history"
..."even though this history zigzags, though it passes, if need be, through other problems or onto different planes." [18]

newness / creativity: "each concept carries out a new cutting-out, takes on new contours, and must be reactivated or recut"

Becoming - Combination and Assemblages
"a concept also has a becoming that involves its relationship with concepts situated on the same plane."
"here concepts link up with each other, support one another, coordinate their contours, articulate their respective problems, and belong to the same philosophy, even if they have different histories" [assemblage]
"having a finite number of components, every concept will branch off toward a finite number of concepts that are differently composed but that constitute other regions of the same plane, answer to problems that can be connected to each other, and participate in a co-creation"
"a concept requires not only a problem through which it recasts or replaces earlier concepts but a junction of problems where it combines with other coexisting concepts"

ex: the Other Person: not subj/obj, condition of all perception, transformation

apology for complex example... [19] reminder there is no simple concept

the nature of concepts, or, the 'concept of concept' ****
1) "Every concept relates back to other concepts, not only in its history but in its becoming or its present connections" ...
*they "extend to infinite" and "are never created from nothing"

2) distinctive = it renders components inseparable within itself
-its endo-consistency are distinct, heterogeneous, and yet not separable
-a threshold of indiscernibility, partial overlap, zone of neighborhood
--defined by a 'zone'

*but the concept also has an exo-consistency w/ other subjects [20]
construction of a bridge on the same plane
--defined by a 'bridge'

3) concepts as the point of coincidence, condensation, or accumulation of its own components [intensive features]
-an "intensive ordinate", not a general or particular but a singularity that is particularized or generalized depending upon whether it is given variable values or a constant function*****

-haecceity [AC]
-ex: constant genus: variable species :: constant species: variable individual
-syneidetic not synthesis, heterogenesis: an order of its components by zones of neighborhood
-ordinal, an intension present in all the features that make it up

[[buchanan: Deleuze tells us that a concept is syneidetic, that is, the result of synthesizing the eidos of each concept it subsumes and replaces; concepts are not synesthetic. However, as I have suggested, unless they are formal, concepts always bear the traces of their synesthetic genesis. Even so abstract a term as Being (as the condition of beings) bears traces of the human perspective of looking for an economizing sign in which to gather up a multitude of specifics.]] Bergson: "Eidos is the stable view taken on the instability of things"

"the concept is in a state of survey [survol] in relation to its components, endlessly traversing them according to an order without distance. It is immediately co-present to all its components or variations, at no distance from them, passing back and forth through them: it is a refrain, an opus with its number (chiffre)" [20-1] (huh?)

*incorporeal: "even though it is incarnated or effectuated in bodies" [21]
-"it is not mixed up with the state of affairs in which it is effectuated"
-no spatio-temporal coordinates, only intensive ordinates
-no energy, only intensities
-anenergetic (energy is not intensity but rather the way in which the latter is deployed and nullified in an extensive state of affairs)

****"The concept speaks the event, not the essence or the thing -- pure Event, a heccicity, an entity"
-"The concept is defined by _the separability of a finite number of heterogeneous components traversed by a point of absolute survey at infinite speed_"
-concepts are "absolute surface or volumes", forms whose only object is the inseparability of distinct variations
-"survey" "the state of the concept or its specific infinity, although the infinities may be larger or smaller according to the number of components, thresholds and bridges."
-"the concept is act of thought, it is thought operating at infinite (though greater or lesser) speed" ****** [21]
Concept as both Absolute and Relative
-relative to:
-----its own components, other concepts, the plane on which it is defined,
and to the problems it is supposed to resolve
-absolute through:
-----the condensation it carries out, the site it occupies on the plane, and the conditions it assigns to the problem
--as whole it is absolute, but insofar as it is fragmentary it is relative
--"it is _infinite through its survey or its speed but finite through its movement that traces the contour of its components_"

Concept vs Ontology, Use (pedagogy) [22]
-"what remains absolute, however, is the way in which the created concept is posited in itself and with others"
-"the relativity and absoluteness of the concept are like its pedagogy and its ontology, its creation and its self-positing, its ideality and its reality - the concept is real without being actual, ideal without being abstract" **** [VIRUTAL CONCEPTS]
-"the concept is defined by its consistence, its endoconsistency and exoconsistency, but its has no _reference:_ it is self-referential; it posits itself and its object at the same time as it is created. Constructivism unites the relative and the absolute."

4) concept is not discursive, phil is not discursive formation
--b/c it's NOT ABOUT PROPOSITIONs (which is science)
-"confusing concept and proposition produces a belief in the existence of scientific concepts and a view of the proposition as a genuine "intension" (what the sentence expresses)."
-phil concept usually appears only as prop deprived of sense
-continues critiques of logical propositions as phil...

**"the major differences between the philosophical enunciation of fragmentary concepts and the scientific enunciation of partial propositions follow from this digression" [23]
-"it is clear that scientific propositions and their correlates are just as signed or created as philosophical concepts"
-diff in use of proper names for concepts "Hamiltonian number" etc in sci/phil
**** [24]
phil = concepts (not general or abstract ideas)
science = prospects (propositions not judgments)
art = percepts and affects (not perceptions or feelings)

EXAMPLE 1:
Descartes and self/cogito
3 parts:
1) doubting
2) thinking
3) being
"I think 'therefore' I am"
more completely: "Myself who doubts, I think, I am, I am a thinking thing."

Picture... [25]
-Condenses at point I, which passes through components I' (doubting)
I" (thinking) and I"' (being) coincide.
-zones of indiscernibility
1) I' & I" (doubting and thinking)
   (myself who doubts, I cannot doubt that I think)
2) I" & I"' (thinking and being)
   (in order to think it is necessary to be)

"doubt include moments that aren't the species of a genus, but the _phases_ of a variation: the perceptual, scientific, obsessional doubt"
(every concept therefore has a phase space, although not in the same way as in science) -- phase space = virtual?

Same goes for: modes of thought -- feeling, imagining, having ideas
types -- being, thing, substance, infinite being, finite thinking being, extended being

"among my ideas I have the idea of infinity" = bridge from concept of self to concept of God [26]

God has three components forming "proofs" of the existence of God as infinite event
-3rd (ontological proof) = closure of concept, but also a bridge that guarantees the objective value of our other clear and distinct ideas

so, the question "are there precursors of the cogito", what is really asked...
"are there concepts signed by previous philosophers that have similar or almost identical components but from which one component is lacking, or to which other have been added, so that a cogito does not crystallize since the components do not yet coincide in a self?"

Q of the cogito = not about objectivity as presupposition of truth, but certainty of knowledge [26-7]

END OF EXAMPLE
Point is not asking if "right or wrong" but "assessed as a function of their problems and their plane"
"concepts can only be replaced by others if there are new problems and another plane relative to which (for example) "I" loses all meaning, the beginning loses all necessity, and the presuppositions lose all difference - or take on others." [27] - nietzsche's constructivism (misty shrouded illusions)

NOT "one plane that is better than all the others, or problems that dominate all others"
**"plane must be constructed and problems posed, just as concepts must be created"
"If one concept is "better" than an earlier one, it is because it makes us aware of new variations and unknown resonances, it carries out unforeseen cuttings-out, it brings forth an Event that surveys [survole] us" [28]
"What is the best way to follow the greater philosophers? Is it to repeat what they said or _to do what they did_, that is, create concepts for problems that necessarily change?" ******

**Against discussion! Against critique! "the best one can say about discussions is that they take things no farther, since the participants never talk about the same thing."
"communication always comes too early or too late, and when it comes to creating, conversation is always superfluous" -- swipe at democracy
"Nothing is less exact, and when philosophers criticize each other it is on the basis of problems and on a plane that is different form theirs and that melt down the old concepts in the way a cannon can be melted down to make new weapons."
"To criticize is only to establish that a concept vanishes when it is thrust into a new milieu, losing some of its components, or acquiring others than transform it."
"those who criticize without creating, those who are content to defend the vanished concept without being able to give it the forces it needs to return to life, are the plague of philosophy. All these debaters and communicators are inspired by _ressentiment_. They speak only of themselves when they set empty generalizations against one another. Philosophy has a horror of discussions." [28-9]

EXAMPLE 2 Plato

Parmenides = Plato is master of the concept

The One has 2:
- components, [being/non-being]
- phases of components, [The One superior to being, equal to being, inferior
to being; the One superior to nonbeing, equal to nonbeing
-zones of indiscernibility (in relation to itself, in relation to others)

Is One prior to every concept?
-Plato teaches the opposite of what he does
-he creates concepts, but sets as represented the uncreated the precedes them
(An 'objectality', Anterior, time)
-on the Platonic plane, truth is posed as presupposition, already there
"The Idea"
-1st a pure quality, objectively possessing a pure quality/not other than itself (Ideas: Justice, Courage, etc) [30]
-but Things are always being something other than what they are
-at best, possess secondary quality (laying claim to a quality, participate in an Idea)

Idea's components:
-quality possessed or to be possessed
(Idea possesses it first, unparticipable: participants come after)
-the Idea participated in judges the claims (the Father, a double of father, the daughter and the suitors)

Intensive coordinates of the Idea: = claims justified through a neighborhood / greater-lesser proximity it "has had" in relation to the Idea, survey of an always necessarily anterior time (time is the Ideas zone)
*cogito can't exist on this plane!
-as long as preexistence of Idea remains, no cogito
-the claim changes qualitatively!! [31]
----"the suitor no longer receives the daughter from the father but owes her hand only to his own chivalric prowess -- to his own method"

concepts cause EXCLUSIONS
"a concept always has components that can prevent the appearance of another concept or, on the contrary, that can themselves appear only at the cost of the disappearance of other concepts"
--however, "a concept is never valued by reference to what it prevents: it is valued for its incomparable position and its own creation"

Adding components --> "break up or undergo a complete change involved, perhaps another plane - at any rate, other problems"
ex: Kantian cogito, "transcendental plane"
-renders doubt useless, and change the nature of presuppositions
-Kant demands the introduction of a new component that D repressed - time
--- now passive/phenom self, and also affectable, modifiable, variable self
4 components of Kantian cogito:
1) I think, and as such I am active;
2) I have an existence
3) this existence is only determinable in time as a passive self
4) I am therefore determined as a passive self that necessarily represents
its own thinking activity to itself as an Other (Autre) that affects it
--this is not another subject but rather the subject who becomes an
other[32]
-prep for "I is an other" which is even diff (syntax, ordinates, zones,
etc)

****"The history of philosophy means that we evaluate not only the
historical novelty of the concepts created by a philosopher but also the
power of their becoming when they pass into one another"

END OF EXAMPLE

Pedagogical status of the concept:

Multiplicity::
-absolute surface or volume
-self-references
-made up of a certain number of inseparable intensive variations according
to an order of neighborhood
-transversed by a point in a state of survey

Concept::
-(contour, configuration, constellation) of an event to come [33]
-"the task of phil when it creates concept, entities, is always to extract
an event from things and beings, to set up the new event from things and
beings, always to give them a new event: space, time, matter, thought, the
possible as events."

Science:
"even when science is concerned with the same "objects" (as philosophy) it
is not from the viewpoint of the concept; it is not by creating concepts"
-Q of the lived.
"science needs only propositions or functions, whereas philosophy, for its
part, does not need to invoke a lived that would give only a ghostly and
extrinsic life to a secondary, bloodless concepts."
"the phil concept does not refer to the lived, by way of compensation, but
consists, through its own creation, it setting up an event that surveys the
whole of the lived no less than every state of affairs"

"The greatness of a philosophy is measured by the nature of the events to
which its concepts summon us or that it enables us to release in concepts.
So the unique, exclusive bond between concepts and philosophy as a creative
discipline must be tested in its finest details. The concept belongs to
philosophy and only to philosophy." ***** [34]

Chapter 2: The Plane of Immanence [35]

"Philosophical concepts are fragmentary wholes that are not aligned with one another so that they fit together, b/c their edges do not match up. They are not pieces of a jigsaw puzzle but rather the outcome of throws of the dice. They resonate nonetheless, and the philosophy that creates them always introduces a powerful Whole that, while remaining open, is not fragmented: an unlimited One-All, an "Omnitudo" that includes all the concepts on one and the same plane"

Plane:
-"a table, a plateau, or a slice"
-plane of consistence, or plane of immanence of concepts, the planomenon

concepts - plane = correlative

"The plane of immanence is neither a concept nor the concept of all concepts"

****"Philosophy is a constructivism, and constructivism has two qualitatively different complementary aspects: the creation of concepts and the layout out of a plane" [36]
-waves (rhythm, interference waves, etc)
-----concepts = multiple waves, plane of imm = single wave that rolls them up
"the plane envelops infinite movements that pass back and forth through it, but concepts are the infinite speeds of finite movements that, in each case, pass only through their own components"
-"both elasticity of the concept and fluidity of the milieu are needed"

plane as body (spinozist)
"concepts are the archipelago or skeletal frame, a spinal column rather than a skull, whereas the plane is the breath that suffuses the separate parts"
--concept: "absolute surfaces or volumes, formless and fragmentary"
-----concrete assemblages, like the configurations of a machine
------events
--plane: "formless, unlimited absolute, neither surface nor volume but always fractal"
------abstract machine, of which the assempl = working parts
------horizon of events, the reservoir/reserve of purely conceptual events
------**not the relative horizon that fx as a limit (that changes with an observer and encloses observable states of affairs)
**absolute horizon, indp of any observer**

makes the event as concept indp of a visible st8 of affrs in which it is brought about

"concepts pave, occupy, or populate the plane bit by bit, whereas the plane itself is the indivisible milieu in which concepts are distributed without breaking up its continuity or integrity: they occupy it without measuring it out (the concept's combination is not a number) or are distributed without splitting it up."

fractal/connective plane

"the plane has no other regions than the tribes populating and moving around on it. it is the plane that secures conceptual linkages with ever increasing connections, and it is concepts that secure the populating of the plane on an always renewed and variable curve." [36-7]

--not ontological or 'thought', but an image of thought

"the image thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one's bearing in thought" [37]

***not method! (since every method is concerned with concepts and presupposes such an image)

---not "state of knowledge on the brain" (neuro-), nor opinion

**the image of thought thought implies a strict division between fact and right!!

---and what is the "right" of the image of thought?

::: "infinite movement or the movement of the infinite"

---NOT "spatiotemporal coordinates that define the successive positions of a moving object and the fixed reference points in relation to which these positions vary"

****"it is the horizon itself that is in movement" [38]

--rejection of subject and object

-infinite movement is double, and there is only a fold from one to the other

Two Facets: Thought and Nature // Nous and Physis

--"even the negative produces infinite movements"

"it is this fractal nature that makes the planomenon an infinite that is always different from any surface or volume determinable as a concept. every movement passes through the whole of the plane by immediately turning back on and folding itself and also by folding other movements or allowing itself to be folded by them, giving rise to retroactions, connections, and proliferations in the fractalization of this infinitely folded up infinity
"But if it is true that the plane of immanence is always single, being itself pure variation, then it is all the more necessary to explain why there are varied and distinct planes of immanence that, depending upon which infinite movements are retained and selected, succeed and contest each other in history" [39]

--greeks v 17C v today "there is neither the same image of thought nor the same substance of being"

Plane NOT its concepts
"they belong to the plane quite differently as image or substance"

::elements of the plane are _diagrammatic features_, whereas concepts are _intensive features_.

---"the former are movements of the infinite, whereas the latter are intensive ordinates of these movements, like original section or differential positions: finite movements in which the infinite is now only speed and each of which constitutes a surface or a volume, an irregular contour marking a halt in the degree of proliferation. The former are _directions_ that are fractal in nature, whereas the latter are absolute _dimensions_, intensively defined, always fragmentary surfaces or volumes. The former are _intuitions_, and the latter _intensions_." [40]

A2: Hallward or "all power in the virtual"
"we should not conclude form this that concepts are deduced from the plane: concepts require a special construction distinct from that of the plane, which is why concepts must be created jsut as the plane must be set up. Intensive features are never the consequence of diagrammatic features, and intensive ordinates are not deduced from movements or directions. Their correspondence goes beyond even simple resonances and introduces instances adjunct to the creation of concepts, namely, conceptual personae"

Plane = Pre-philosophical:
"something _that does not exist outside philosophy_, although philosophy presupposes it" [41]
-its internal conditions (and changes with each phil, Descartes, Plato, Heidegger, etc)

"The nonphilosophical is perhaps closer to the heart of philosophy than philosophy itself, and this means that philosophy cannot be content to be understood only philosophically or conceptually, but is addressed essentially to non-philosophy as well"***** 11th thesis on feuerbach.... [41]

mutual constitution of plane + concepts
"the plane is clearly not a program, design, end, or means: it is a plane of immanence that constitutes the absolute ground of philosophy, its earth
or deterritorialization, the foundation on which it creates its concepts. Both the creation of concepts and the instituting of the plane are required, like two wings or fins."

"What is at stake" arg
"thinking provokes general indifference." "Indeed, it is only when the dangerous become obvious that indifference ceases, but they often remain hidden and barely perceptible, inherent in the enterprise"
-"groping experimentation and its layout resorts to measures that are not very respectable, rational, or reasonable" hahaha. anti-OOO stuff.

Sieve analogy + chaos (I never seem to get it...) [42]
"the plane of immanence is like a section of chaos and acts like a sieve."
****"chaos is characterized less by the absence of determinations than by the infinite speed with which they take shape and vanish"
-not move from det to det, but imposbly of connx btwn them (like quantum physics?)
-Chaos is not an inert or stationary state, nor is it a chance mixture. Chaos makes chaotic and undoes every consistency in the infinite. The problem of philosophy is to acquire a consistency without losing the infinite into which thought plunges (in this respect chaos has as much a mental as a physical existence). To give consistency without losing anything of the infinite is very different from the problem of science, which seeks to provide chaos with reference points, on condition of renouncing infinite movements and speeds and of carrying out a limitation of speed first of all"

The Greeks [43]
- boring arg about end of transcendence, etc.
- "Reason is only a concept, and a very impoverished concept for defining the plane and the movements that pass through it"
- not sages or priests but philosophers
- "Whenever there is transcendence, vertical Being, imperial State in the sky or on earth, there is religion; and there is Philosophy whenever there is immanence, even if it functions as arena for the agon and rivalry"
- "Philosophers carry out a vast diversion of wisdom; they place it at the service of pure immanence. They replace genealogy with geology."

Example 3:
contrast Physicalists (Being) with noologists (image of thought)
- but even that's confused, b/c plane of imm = "dative"

"Whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent "to" something a confusion of plane and concept results, so that the concept becomes a transcendent universal and the plane becomes an attribute to the concept. When misunderstood in this way, the plane of immanence revives the transcendent
again: it is a simple field of phenomena that now only possesses in a secondary way that which first of all is attribute to the transcendent unity" [45]

--Religious appropriation, rejected.

"immanence can be said to be the burning issue of all philosophy because it takes on all the dangers that phil must confront, all the condemnation, persecution, and repudiations that it undergoes. This at least persuades us that the problem of immanence is not abstract or merely theoretical."

"In any case, whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent _to_ Something, we can be sure that this Something reintroduces the transcendent."
ex: cogito "Immanence is supposed to be immanent to a pure consciousness, to a thinking subject"

-- "Kant calls it transcendental rather than transcendent" "He may even allow himself the luxury of denouncing transcendent Ideas, so as to make them the "horizon" of the field immanent to the subject. But, in so doing, Kant discovers the modern way of saving transcendence: this is no longer the transcendence of a Something, or of a One higher than everything (contemplation), but that of a Subject to which the field of immanence is only attributed by belonging to a self that necessarily represents such a subject to itself (reflection)." [46]

"when immanence becomes immanent "to" a transcendental subjectivity, it is at the heart of its own field that the hallmark or figure [chiffre] of a transcendence must appear as action now referring to another self, to another consciousness (communication)." -- Husserl

"In this modern moment we are no longer satisfied with thinking immanence as immanent to a transcendent; _we want to think transcendence within the immanent, and it is from immanence that a breach is expected._" [47] --Jaspers' "Encompassing" but that's just a ground-clearing for Transcendent to save us...

-Sartre... "presupposition of an impersonal transcendental field restores the rights of immanence"

"when immanence is no longer immanent to something other than itself it is possible to speak of a plane of immanence. Such a plane is, perhaps, a radical empiricism: it does not present a flux of the lived that is immanent to a subject and individualized in that which belongs to a self. It presents only events, that is, possible worlds as concepts, and other people as expressions of possible world or conceptual personae. The event does not relate the lived to a transcendental subject = Self but, on the contrary, is related to the immanent survey of a field without subject; the
Other Person does not restore transcendence to an other self but returns every other self to the immanence of the field surveyed. Empiricism knows only events and other people and is therefore a great creator of concepts. Its force begins from the moment it defines the subject: a _habitus_, a habit, nothing but a habit in a field of immanence, the habit of saying I."

---Spinoza...
"discovered that freedom exists only within immanence." [48]
"immanence does not refer back to the Spinozist substance and modes but, on the contrary, the Spinozist concepts of substance and modes refer back to the plane of immanence as their presupposition" "This plane presents two sides to us, extension and thought, or rather its two powers, power of being and power of thinking"

--Bergson:
"marks out a plane that slice through the chaos -- both the infinite movement of a substance that continually propagates itself, and the image of thought that everywhere continually spreads a pure consciousness by right (immanence is not immanent "to" consciousness but the other way around) [49]

END of example 3

Illusions of Thought
"The plane is surrounded by illusions. These are not abstract misinterpretations or just external pressures but rather thought's mirages."
--"in part at least, ... illusions arise from the plane itself"

------ hallucinations, erroneous perceptions, bad feelings
*infinite list of illusions
1 -illusion of transcendence,
(i) immanence immanent-to, (ii) rediscovering a transcendence within immanence
2 -illusion of universals (when concepts are confused with the plane)
3 -illusion of the eternal (concepts must be created)
4 -illusions of discursiveness (when props are confused w/ concepts) [50]

Multiplicity of Planes
"we can and must presuppose a multiplicity of planes, since no one plane could encompass all of chaos without collapsing back into it; and each retains only movements which can be folded together." [50]
"it is because each plane has its own way of constructing immanence. each plane carries out a selection of that which is due to thought by right, but this selection varies from one plane to another"
not just planes, but how they are distributed

_The_ plane of immanence is _interleaved_. [interleaving is a way to arrange data in a non-contiguous way to increase performance.]

Every great phil = new plane of imm [51]
"those who do not renew the image of thought are not philosophers but functionaries who, enjoying a ready-made thought, are not even conscious of the problem and are unaware even of the efforts of those they claim to take as their models" [damn!]

risk of new plane:
"every plane is not only interleaved but holed, letting through the fogs that surround it [the fogs of the 4 errors from 49-50], and in which the phil who laid it out is in danger of being the first to lose himself."
"that so many fogs arise explnd in 2 ways"
1) b/c thought cannot stop itself from interp imm as imm-to, the great Obje of contempl, the Subj of refl, or the Other of comm: then transcendence is inevitably reintroduced.
2) And if this cannot be avoided because it seems that each plane of imm can only claim to be u/q, to be _the_ plan, by reconstituting the chaos it had to ward off: the choice is between transcendence and chaos."

Example 4:
"that which belongs to thought by right, that which is retained as diagrammatic featuer in itself, represses other rival determinations (even if these latter are called upon to receive a concept)" [52]
ex: Descartes...
what threatens thinking? stupidity, forgetfulness, aphasia, delirium, madness...
...but it's all error! "error is the infinite movement that gathers together the whole of the negative."

When ignorance and superstition replace error and prejudice...
"the movement given a negative sign is itself folded within other movements with positive or ambiguous signs" [53]
...the status of belief and knowledge....

-new Modern truth... [54]
"As Nietzsche succeeded in making us understand, thought is creation, not will to truth. But if, contrary to what seemed to be the case in the classical image, there is not will to truth, this is because thought constitute a simple "possibility" of thinking without yet defining a thinker "capable" of it and able to say "I""

"what violence must be exerted on thought for us to become capable of
thinking; what violence of an infinite movement that, at the same time, take from us our power to say "I"? Famous texts of Heidegger and Blanchot deal with this second characteristic." [55]

"But a third characteristic, if there is in this way an "Incapacity" of thought," .... "as Kleist or Artaud suggests, thought as such begins to exhibit snarls, squeals, stammers;it talks in tongues and screams, which leads it to create, or to try to. If thought searches, it is less in the manner of someone who possesses a method than that of a dog that seems to be making uncoordinated leaps. We have no reason to take pride in this image of thought, which involves much suffering without glory and indicates the degree to which thinking has become increasingly difficult: immanence." [55]

***** more groping! experimentation!

-portraiture...
A machinic portrait of Kant (that thing that looks like the Midnite Notes capitalist octopus) [56]

END OF EXAMPLE [57]

--rx between the same and different planes... staying on one or changing them... (plato, neo-platonists, or kant and neo-kantians, etc) "this involves extending the original plane by giving it new curves, until a doubt arises: is this not a different plane that is woven in the mesh of the first one?" [57]

--is someone a disciple of another philosopher, or heavily modifying?

Assemblage stuff: "concepts that happens to populate a single plane, albeit at quite different times and with special connections, will be called concepts of the sae group" "those concepts that refer back to different planes will not belong to the same group." [58]

Is one plane better than another??

-must give up the narrowly historical point of view

***stratiographic (graphic of the strata)
"where "before" and "after" indicate only an order of superimpositions. Certain paths (movements) take on sense and direction only as the shortcuts or detours of faded paths; a variable curvature can appear only as the transformation fo one or more others; a stratum or layer of the plane of immanence will necessarily be _above_ or _below_ in relation to another, and images of thought cannot arise in any order whatever because they involved changes of orientation that can be directly located only on the earlier image (and even the point of condensation that determines the concept sometimes presupposes the breaking-up of a point or the
conglomeration of earlier points)."

"Mental landscapes do not change haphazardly through the ages: a mountain had to rise here or a river to flow by there again recently for the ground, now dry and flat, to have a particular appearance and texture. It is true that very old strata can rise to the surface again, can cut a path through the formations that covered them and surface directly on the current stratum to which they impart of new curvature. Furthermore, depending on the regions considered, superimposition are not necessarily the same and do not have the same order. Philosophical time is thus a grandiose time of coexistence that does not exclude the before and after but _simperimposes_ them in a stratigraphic order. It is an infinite becoming of philosophy that crosscuts its history without being confused with it"

NOT SUCESSION, but STRATA/LAYERS (against Kuhn) "The life of philosophers, and what is most external to their work, conforms to the ordinary laws of succession; but their proper names coexist and shine either as luminous points that take us through the components of a concept once more or as the cardinal points of a stratum or layer that continually come back to us, like dead stars whose light is brighter than ever. Philosophy is becoming, not history; it is the coexistence of planes, not the succession of systems."[59]

--THE plane of immanence as the becoming of philosophy...
--some Spinoza superlatives... [60]

Chapter 3: Conceptual Personae [61]

Example 5:
-Decartes' cogito has presuppositions (but in a diff way that 'propositional presupps, they're implicit, subjective, preconceptual "forming an image of thought"
--'everyone knows what thinking means'
-'everyone can think'
-'everyone wants the truth'

'conceptual personae' "something else, somewhat mysterious, that appears from time to time or that show through a seems to have a hazy existence halfway between concept and preconceptual plane, passing from one to the other" [61]

-D: "The Idiot": private thinker, not public teacher [62]

"The history of philosophy must go through these personae, through their
changes according to plane and through their variety according to concepts. Philosophy constantly brings conceptual personae to life; it gives life to them" [62]

the idiot --> Dostoyevski [62]
--wants indubitable truths

threads between the two [63]

"It is possible that the conceptual persona only rarely or allusively appears for himself." "Nevertheless, he is there, and however nameless and subterranean, he must always be reconstituted by the reader." [63] --> Plato in Platonism (but there is danger in confusing the dialogue's characters with conceptual personae: they only nominally coincide and do not have the same role.)
---the concepts laid out by alternative character all exist on the plane of immanence that the philosopher lays out. they are all an exploration of the same plane.
"positive movement" - "attractive concepts" and "sympathetic personae" [64]

"The conceptual persona is not the philosopher's representative but, rather, the reverse: the philosopher is only the envelope of his principal conceptual persona and of all the other personae who are the intercessors" [64]
"Conceptual personae are the philosopher's "heteronyms" and the philosopher's name is the simple pseudonym of his personae. I am no longer myself but thought's aptitude for finding itself and spreading across a plane that passes through me at several places."

"The conceptual persona is the becoming or the subject of a philosophy, on a par w/ the philosopher" [64]
- speech acts that speak to a "subjacent third person" (I speak as your father)
--> "I will as Zarathustra" "I dance as Dionysus"

****"Even Bergsonian duration has need of a runner. In philosophical enunciations we do not do something by saying it but produce movement by thinking it, through the intermediary of a concept-[pg]ual persona. Conceptual personae are also the true agents of enunciations." [64-5]

Nietzsche -- "creates immense an intense concepts ("forces", "value", "becoming", "life"; and repulsive concepts like ressentiment and "bad conscience"), juast as he lays out a new plane of immanence (infinite movements of the will to power and the eternal return) that completely changes the image of thought (criticism of the will to truth)."
-CP in N aren't mythical personifications or literary or novelistic heroes 
"becoming is not being"

diff btwn CP and 'aesthetic figures'
-CP are powers of concepts, AF are powers of affects/percepts
-CP = take effect in plane of imm that is an image of THought-Being
(noumenon)
-AF = take efct on plane of composition as an image of a Universe
(phenomenon)
"Melville said that a novel includes an infinite number of interesting
characters but just one original Figure like the single sun of a
constellation of a universe, like [pg] the beginning of things, or like the
beam of light that draws a hidden universe out of the shadow: hence Captain
Ahab, or Bartleby." [65-6]

"Figures have nothing to do with resemblance or rhetoric but are the
condition under which the arts produce affects of stone and metal, of
strings and wind, of line and color, on a plane of composition of a
universe." [66]

Mixture of CP/AF
"This does not mean that the two entities [conceptual personae & aesthetic
figures] do not often pass into each other in a becoming that sweeps them
both up in an intensity which co-determines them."
-ex of mixes, names, ideas...
-thinkers who are half-philosopher [67]
-but not just a synthesis of art+phil, but something diff

CP NOT psychosocial types! [67]

*animals and territory /territorialization [67]
-hominid (from the Parnet politics thing)

"everyone, at every age, in the smallest things as [pg] in the greatest
challenges, seeks a territory, tolerates or carries out
deterritorializations, and is reterritorialized on almost anything -
memory, fetish, or dream. Refrains express these powerful dynamisms: my
cabin in Canada ... farewell, I am leaving ... yes, it's me; I had to come
back. We cannot even say what comes first, and perhaps every territory
presupposes a prior deterritorizaton, or everything happens at the same
time." [67-8]

"Social fields are inextricable knots in which the three movements are
mixed up so that, in order to disentangle them, we have to _diagnose real
types or personae_.”
--"the merchant buys in a territory, deterritorializes products into
commodities, and is reterritorialized on commercial circuits. In capitalism, capital or property is deterritorialized, ceases to be landed, and is reterritorialized on the means of production; whereas labor becomes "abstract" labor, reterritorialized in wages: this is why Marx no only speaks of capital and labor but feels the need to draw up some true psychosocial types, both antipathetic and sympathetic: _the_ capitalist, _the_ proletarian." [68] ex: Greek, chinese

"We believe that psychosocial types have this meaning: to make perceptible, in the most insignificant or most important circumstances, the formation of territories, the vectors of deterritorialization, and the process of reterritorialization."

-- "spiritual" -- Fatherland, etc...

"The role of conceptual personae is to show thought's territories, its absolute deterritorialization and reterritorializations." [69] "Conceptual personae are thinkers, solely thinkers, and their personalized features are closely linked to the diagrammatic features of thought and the intensive features of concepts. A particular conceptual persona, who perhaps did not exist before us, thinks in us." -stammering... (making the whole language stammer)

"Stammerer, friend, or judge do not lose their concrete existence but, on the contrary, take on a new one as thought's internal conditions for its real existence with this or that conceptual persona. This is not two friends who engage in thought; rather, it is thought itself that requires the thinker to be a friend so that thought is divided up within itself and can be exercised. It is thought itself which requires this division of thought between friends. These are no longer empirical, psychological, and social determinations, still less abstractions, but intercessors, crystals, or seeds of thought." [69]

-- "abstract" -- "rather, there is a conjunction, a system of referrals or perpetual relays." [70]

--> "the physical and mental movement of psychosocial types, their pathological symptoms, their relational attitudes, their existential modes, and their legal status, become susceptible to a determination purely of thinking and of thought that wrest them from both the historical state of affairs of a society and the lived experience of individuals, in order to turn them into the features of conceptual personae, or _thought-events- on the plane laid out by thought or under the concepts it creates. Conceptual personae and psychosocial types refer to each other and combine without ever merging." [71] 

Features of CP:
1) pathic features (ex: Idiot, Madman, Already-there, schizophrenic
2) relational features (ex: Friend, Claimant, Rival, Boy, etc etc [71]
3) dynamic features: (leaping, dancing diving --> new sports of 'surfing'
--insert themselves on existing energetic networks
4) juridical features: "what belongs to it by right" and Justice.
-merge judge and innocent (like Alice): "being be judge from within" "not
at all in the name of the Law or of Values or even by the virtue of their
conscience but by the pure immanent criteria of their existence ("at all
events, beyond Good and Evil does not mean beyond good and bad")?" [72]
5) existential features: "Nietzsche said that philosophy invents modes of
existence or possibilities of life"
-funny quips on how philosopher's living of their conceptual personae make
them appear quirky. (some stuff on being reborn as public garden or zoo)

EXAMPLE 6:

"even illusions of transcendence are useful to us and provide vital
anecdotes - for when we take pride in encountering the transcendent within
immanence, all we do is recharge the plane of immanence with immanence
itself" [73]
-ex; kierkegaard

quoting a guy on "chinese thought":
-"transcendence is relative and represents no more than an "absolutization
of immanence." there is not the slightest reason for thinking that modes
of existence need transcendent values by which they could be compared,
selected, and judged relative to one another. On the contrary, there are
only immanent criteria. A possibility of life is evaluated through itself
in the movements it lays out and the intensities it creates on a plane of
immanence: what is not laid out or created is rejected. A mode of
existence is good or body, noble or vulgar, complete or empty, independent
of Good and Evil or any transcendent value: there are never any criteria
other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life." [74]

"believing in this world, i this life, becomes our most difficult task, or
the task of a mode of existence still to be discovered on our plane of
immanence today. This is the empiricist conversion (we have so many
reasons not to believe in the human world; we have lost the world, worse
than a fiancée or a god). The problem has indeed changed." [75]

END OF EXAMPLE

CP and Plane of Imm presuppose each other *** [75]

"On the one hand: it plunges into the chaos from which it extracts the
determinations which which it produces the diagrammatic features of a plane
of immanence: it is as if it seizes a handful of dice from chance-chaos so
as to throw them on a table. On the other hand, the persona establishes a correspondence between each throw of the dice and the intensive features of a concept that will occupy this or that region of the table, as if the table were split according to combinations. Thus, the conceptual personae with its personalized features intervenes between chaos and the diagrammatic features of the plane of immanence and also between the plane and the intensive features of the concepts that happen to populate it: _Igitur_.

"Conceptual personae constitute points of view according to which planes of immanence are distinguished from one another or brought together, but they also constitute the conditions under which each plane find itself filled with concepts of the same group. Every thought is a Fiat, expressing a throw of the dice: constructivism. But this is a very complex game, because throwing involves infinite movements that are reversible and folded within each other so that the consequences can only be produced at infinite speed by creating finite forms corresponding to the intensive ordinates of these movements: every concept is a combination that did not exist before. Concepts are not deduced from the plane. The conceptual persona is needed to create concepts on the [pg] plane, just as the plane itself needs to be laid out. But these two operations do not merge in the persona, which itself appears as a distinct operator." [75-6]

**intersection and combination of 'innumberable planes' [76]
-"infinity of possible concepts on a plane: they resonate and connect up with mobile bridges"
-negative movement = risks/dangers fronted by thought, false perceptions and bad feelings that surround it
-antipathetic CP = don't manage to free self from
-repulsive concepts: locked within attractive ones... (traps? black holes?)

three elements;
--prephilosophical plane that must be laid out (immanence)
--persona or personae it must invest/bring to life (insistence)
--phil concepts it must create (consistency)
also said:
--laying out (diagrammatic)
--inventing (personalistic)
--creating (intensive)

composition of each:
"concepts are grouped according to whether they resonate or throw out mobile bridges, covering the same plane of immanence that connections them to one another."
"families of planes according to whether the infinite movements of thought fold within one another and compose variations of curvature or, on the
contrary, select non-composable varieties"
"types of persona according to the possibility of even their hostile
encounters on the same plane and in a group."

"none of these elements are deduced from the other, there must be
coadaption of the three"
that coadaption = "taste"
---laying out plane: Reason
---invention of personae: Imagination
---creation of concepts; Understanding
"taste appears as the triple faculty of the still-undetermined concept, of
the persona still in limbo, and of the still-transparent plane."
taste = the rule of correspondence (not a faculty of measuring)
-----there can also be 'disgust'
what appears as philosophical taste is the love a well-made concept

-ex: painting [78]

"It is certainly not for "rational or reasonable" reasons that a
particular concept is created or a particular component chosen."

*critique of phil as propositions, again [79]

--3rd way phil is greek... "free opinion" doxa
phil = finding the truth value of opposable opinions
"such was always the meaning of what is called dialectic and that reduces
philosophy to interminable discussion" (another knock on Habermas,
discussion, communication, aporetic thought, etc)
thru Hegel...
"but, beneath the highest ambitions of the dialectic, and irrespective of
the genius of the great dialecticians, we fall back into the most abject
conditions that Nietzsche diagnosed as the art of the pleb or bad taste in
philosophy: a reduction of the concept to propositions like simple
opinions; false perceptions and bad feelings (illusions of transcendence or
of universals) engulfing the plane of immanence; the model of a form of
knowledge the constitute only a supposedly higher opinion, _Urdoxa_; a
replacement of conceptual personae by teachers or leaders of schools."
"The dialectic claims to discover a specifically philosophical
discursiveness, but it can only do this by linking opinions together. It
has indeed gone beyond opinion toward knowledge, but opinion breaks through
and continues to break through. even with the resources of an _Urdoxa_,
philosophy remains a doxography. It is always the same melancholy that
raises disputed Questions and Quadlibets from the Middle Ages where one
learns that each doctor thought without knowing why he thought it (the
Event), and that one finds again in many histories of philosophy in which
solutions are review without even determining what the problem is (substance in Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz), since the problem is only copied from the propositions that serve as its answer." \[80\]

mutual inter-penetration of three elements \[81\]

"Bergson, who contributed so much to the comprehension of the nature of philosophical problems, said that a well-posed problem was a problem solved. But this does not mean that a problem is merely the shadow or epiphenomenon of its solutions, or that the solution is only the redundancy or analytical consequence of the problem. Rather, the three activities making up constructionism continually pass from one to the other, support one another, sometimes precede and sometimes follow each other, one creating concepts as the case of a solution, another laying out a plane and a movement on the plane as the conditions of a problem, and the other investing a persona as the unknown of the problem. The whole of the problem (of which the solution is itself a part) always consists in constructing the other two when the third is underway." \[81\]

Not pre-determined (immanent problematics)

"No rule, and above all no discussion, will say in advance whether this is the good plane, the good persona, or the good concept; for each of them determines if the other two have succeeded or not, but each must be constructed on its own account - one created, one invented, and the other laid out. Problems and solutions are constructed about which we can say, "Failure ... Success ... ," but only as we go along and on the basis of their coadapations. Constructivism disqualifies all discussion - which holds back the necessary construction - just as it exposes all the universals of contemplation, reflection, and communication as sources of what are called "false problems" emanating from the illusions surrounding the plane. That is all that can be said in advance. It is possible that we think we have found a solution; but a new curve of the plane, which at first we did not see, starts it all off again, posing new problems, a new batch of problems, advancing by successive surges and seeking concepts to come, concepts yet to be created (we do not even know if this is not a new plane that has separated from the preceding plane). Conversely, is it possible that a new concept is buried like a wedge between what one thought were two neighboring concepts, seeking in its turn the determination of a problem that appears like a sort of extension on the table of immanence. Philosophy thus lives in a permanent crisis. The plane takes effect through shocks, concepts proceed bursts, and personae by spasms. The relationship among the three instances is problematic by nature." \[82\]

"the criteria for each philosophical activity are found only in the other two" --> phil thru paradox

"Philosophy does not consist in knowing and is not inspired by truth."
Rather it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determines success or failure."

ex: of Nietzsche: bad conscience, the priest, will to power from the point of view of nihilism [83]

***role of criticism (new concepts !!!! -- creativity uninteresting? flimsy concepts, or "concepts that are too regular, petrified, and reduced to a framework. In this respect, the most universal concepts, those presented as eternal forms or values, are the most skeletal and least interesting. Nothing positive is done, nothing at all, in the domains of either criticism or history, when we are content to brandish ready-made old concepts like skeletons intended to intimidate any creation, without seeing that the ancient philosophers from whom we borrow them were already doing what we would like to prevent modern philosophers from doing: they were creating their concepts, and they were not happy just to clean and scrape bones like the critic and historian of our time. even the history of philosophy is complete without interest if it does not undertake to awaken a dormant concept and to play it again on a new stage, even if this comes at the price of turning it against itself." [83]

Chapter 4: Geophilosophy [85]

1) territor/earth = thought
   a) -subj/obj bad approx of thought
   b) Kant is closer than you might think... (Copernican revolution -> Earth)
2) it's the move of the deterr / reterr!
   a) lobsters, pilgrims/knights, etc.
   b) reterr [86]
"territory and earth are two components with two zones of indiscernibility
   i) deterr (from territory to earth)
   ii) reterr (from earth to territory)
can't say which comes first...

**State and City
State
1) juxtaposes and compares ag terr by relating them to a higher arithmetical Unity
2) imperial spatium - deterr that takes place in the spot where the st8 appropriates terr of local groups
3) reterr on palace and its supplies

City
1) adapts terr to a gemoetrical extensiveness that can be continued in commercial circuits
2) political extensio - deterr that takes place in the spot where the city turns its back on its hinterland
3) reterr on the agora and commercial networks

Imperial states - deterr thru transcendence
1) "it tends to develop vertically from on high, according to a celestial component of the earth" (repeating the despotic signifier, imperial and infinite arg)
2) the terr has become desert earth, but a celestial Stranger arrives to reest the terr or reterr the earth

City - deterr thru imma
1) frees an Autochton, a power of the earth that follow a maritime component that goes under the sea to resst the terr (Erechteum, temple of athena and poseidon)
2) imper Strange needs Autochthons and the citizen Autochthon calls on stranger in flight (imp sits on molecular flows, duh)

Fractal structure of Greece - [87]
-close to sea and sides have great length
*athens develop smode of deterr thru imm: form a milieu of immanence
----an "international market", w/ a freedom/mobilized not allowed by empires
---strangers: merchants and philosophers

3 conditions of philosophy in greece (immanence, friendship, opinion)
1) pure sociability as milieu of immanence "intrinsic nature of association"
--opposed to imperial sovereignty and implies no priori interest
2) a certain pleasure in forming associations (friendship) but also breaking them up (rivalry)
3) a taste for opinion inconceivable in an empire, the exchange of views/conversation [88]

Absolute and Relative Deterritorialization [88]

relative:
--historical rx of the earth-territories
-geological rx w/ eras and catastrophes
-astronomical rx w/ costmos-stellar system

absolute:
--when the earth passes into the pure plane of imm of a Being-thought,
Nature-thought of infinite diagrammatic movements
--thinking = stretching out a plane of imm that absorbs the earth (or "adsorbs" it) [condensation on a surface]
-deterr of such a plane doesn't preclude reterr, "but posits it as the creation of a future new earth"
---"absolute deterr can only be thought according to a certain still-to-be-determined relationships with relative deterr that are not only cosmic but geographical, historical, and psychosocial. There is always a way in which absolute deterr takes over from a relative deterr in a given field."

MAJOR DIFF: rx deterr thru imm or thru tran
--"when it is transc, vertical, celestial, and brought about by the imperial unity, the transc element must always give way or submit to a sort of rotation in order to be inscribed on the always-immanent plane of Nature-thought. The celestial vertical settles on the horizontal of the plane of thought in accordance with a spiral. Thinking here implies a projection of the transcendent on the plane of immanence. Transcendence may be entirely empty" in itself, yet it becomes full to the extent that it descends and crosses different hierarchized levels that are projected together on a region of the plane, that is to say, on a n aspect corresponding to an infinite movement. In this respect, it is the same when transcendence invades the absolute or monotheism replaces unity: the transcendent God would remain empty, or at least _abconditus_, if it were not project on a plane of immanence of creation where it traces the stages of its theophany. In both cases, imperial unity or spiritual empire, the transcendence that is project on the plane of immanence paves it or populates it with Figures. It is a wisdom or a religion - it does not much matter which." [89] (wtf? guattari obviously wrote this, it's very confusing) ...some stuff on iconograms...

..."In short, the figure is essentially _paradigmatic_, _projective_, _hierarchical_, and _referential_ (the arts and sciences also set up powerful figures, but what distinguishes them from all religion is not that [pg] they lay claim to prohibited resemblance but that they emancipate a particular level so as to make it into new planes of thought on which, as will be seen, the nature of the references and projections change)." [89-90]

When rx deterr ("itself horizontal, or immanent") combines with abs deterr of plane of imm ("that carries the movements of rx deterr to infinite"), pushes them to the absolute, by transforming them (milieu, friend, opinion). Immanence is redoubled. "This is where one thinks no longer w/ figures but w/ concepts" [90]
"And this is really what the creation of concepts means: to connect internal, inseparable components to the point of closure or saturation so that we can no longer add or withdraw a component without changing the nature of the concept; to connect the concept with another in such a way
that the nature of other connections will change. The plurivocity of the concept depends solely upon neighborhood (one concept can have several neighborhoods)."

"Concepts are flat surfaces without levels, orderings without hierarchy" [flat ontology??]

"The concept is not paradigmatic but _syntagmatic_; not projective but _connective_; not hieararchical but _linking_ (note on language); not referential but _consistent_." [91]

sooo.... diff btwn figures and concepts?
"figures are projects on the plane, which implies something vertical or transcendent"
"concepts, on the other hand, imply only neighborhood and connections on the horizon" [91-2]
--the transc production an "absolutization of imm" through projection [92]
-figures tend toward concepts to the point of drawing infinitely near to them

**atheism [92]
"religions do not arrive at the concept without denying themselves, just as philosophies do not arrive at the figure without betraying themselves"

3 figures of phil:
1) objectality of contemplation
2) subject of reflection
3) intersubjectivity of communication

Universal History and Reason is Contingency!
"philosophy does have a principle, but it is a synthetic and contingent principle - an encounter, a conjunction. It is not insufficient by itself but contingent in itself. Even in the concept, the principle depends upon a connection of components that could have been different, with different neighborhoods. The principle of reason such as it appears in philosophy is a principle of contingent reason and is put like this: there is no good reason but contingent reason; there is universal history except contingency." [93]

EXAMPLE 7 [94]

Rejection Hegel/Heidegger's racist romanticism that creates an analytic and necessary link of philosophy to Greece. .... some stuff about the Orient....

"Thus, Heidegger displaces the problem and situates the concept in the difference between Being and beings rather than in that between subject and
Heidegger + Hegel: "philosophy necessarily becomes indistinguishable from its own history" (the Greeks) [95]

... then a critique of Heidegger -- he fixes deterr between being and begins, the Greek territory and the Western earth (that the Greeks would have called Being) .... (return to later?)

END OF EXAMPLE

Hegel and Heidegger "posit history as a form of interiority in which the concept necessarily develops or unveils its destiny."
- "the necessity rest on the abstraction of the historical element rendered circular. the unforeseeable creation of concepts is thus poorly understood" [95]

"Philosophy is geophilosophy precisely in the same way that history is geohistory from Braudel's point of view"... [pg] "Geography is not confined to providing historical form with a substance and variable places. It is not merely physical and human but mental, like the landscape. Geography wrests history from the cult of necessity in order to stress the irreducibility of contingency. It wrests it from the cult of origins [Hegel and Heidegger's obsession with the Greeks as origin] in order to affirm the power of a "milieu" (what philosophy finds in the Greeks, said Nietzsche, is not an origin but a milieu, an ambiance, an ambient atmosphere: the philosopher ceases to be a comet). It wrests it from structures in order to trace the lines of flight that pass through the Greek world across the Mediterranean. Finally, it wrests history from itself in order to discover becomings that do not belong to history even if they fall back into it: the history of philosophy is Greece must not hide the face that in every case the Greeks had to become philosophers in the first place, just as the philosophers had to become Greek [because they were immigrant Strangers]." [96]

****"Becoming" does not belong to history. History today still designates only the set of conditions, however recent they may be, from which one turns away in order to become, that is to say, in order to create something new." [96] "The Greeks did it, but no turning away's valid once and for all."

"Philosophy cannot be reduced to its own history, because it continually wrests itself from this history in order to create new concepts that fall back into history but do not come from it."

a2: void
"How could something come from history? Without history, becoming would
remain indeterminate and unconditioned, but becoming is not historical. Psychosocial types belong to history, but conceptual personae belong to becoming. The event itself needs becoming as an unhistorical element. The unhistorical, Nietzsche says, "is like an atmosphere within which alone life can germinate and with the destruction of which it must vanish." It is like a moment of grace; and what "deed would man be capable of if he had not first entered into that vaporous region of the unhistorical?"

"Philosophy appears in Greece as a result of contingency rather than necessity, as a result of an ambiance or milieu rather than an origin, of a becoming rather than a history, of a [pg] geography rather than a historiography, of a grace rather than a nature" [97]

cap --> European relative deterr (a "fantastic" one at that!)
- that takes place through immanence

"Marx accurately construction a concept of capitalism by determining the two principle components, naked labor and pure wealth, with their zone of indiscernibility when wealth buys labor."

-Why no cap in China from 3-8C? "West slowly brings together and adjusts these components, whereas the East prevents them from reaching fruition" "Only the West extends and propagates its centers of immanence."

"The social field no longer reers to an external limits that restricts it from above, as in the empires, but to immanent internal limits that constantly shift by extending the system, and that reconstitute themselves through displacement. fn 9"

--> fn9: cap vol 3, pt3 chp15 p250 "Capitalist production seeks continually to overcome these immanent barriers, but overcomes them only by means which again place these barriers in its way and on a more formidable scale. The real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself."

"External obstacles are now only technological, and only internal rivalries remain. A world market extends to the ends of the earth before passing into the galaxy: even the skies become horizontal."

"Husserl said that, even in their hostility, peoples group themselves into types that have a territorial "home" and family kinship, such as the peoples of India; but only in Europe, despite its national rivalries, will propose to itself and other peoples "an incitement to become even more European," so that in the West the whole of humanity is connected to itself as it never was in Greece.fn10" [97-8] [huh?]

The infinite movement of thought, what Husserl calls Telos, must enter into conjunction with the great relative movement of capital that is continually
deterritorialized in order to secure the power of Europe over all other peoples and their reterritorialization on Europe. [colonialism...]

Modern phil's link to cap = the same as Greek to ancient phil ... "the connection of an absolute plane of immanence with a relative social milieu that also functions through immanence" -- not necessary continuity but contingent recommencement of a same contingent process in different conditions....

"The immense rx deterr of world capitalism needs to be reterr on the modern national State, which finds an outcome in democracy, the new society of "brothers," the capitalist version of the society of friends."

"The man of capitalism is not Robinson [Crusoe, like Marx charges capitalists of thinking] but Ulysses, the cunning plebeian, some average man or other living in the big towns, Autochthonous Proletarians or foreign Migrants who throw themselves into infinite movement - revolution. Not one but two cries traverse capitalism and head for the same disappointment: Immigrants of all countries, unite - workers of all countries. At both ends of the West, America and Russia, pragmatism and socialism play out [pg] the return of Ulysses, the new society of brothers or comrades that once again take up the Greece dream and reconstitutes "democratic dignity."" [98-9]

WHY IS PHIL ANTI-CAP??
"what saves modern philosophy is that it is no more the friends of capitalism than ancient philosophy was the friend of the city. Philosophy takes the relative deterritorialization of capitalism to the absolute; it makes it pass over the plane of immanence as movement of the infinite and suppresses it as internal limit, _turns it back against itself so as to summon forth a new earth, a new people_. But in this way it arrives at the nonpropositional form of the concept in which communication, exchange, consensus, and opinion [the three Figural (non-conceptual) elements of philosophy that began w/ the Greeks] vanish entirely." [99]

UTOPIAN
--"It is therefore closer to what Adorno called "negative dialectic" and to what the Frankfurt School called "utopian." Actually, _utopia is what links_ philosophy with its own epoch, with European capitalism, but also already with the Greek city. In each case it is with utopia that philosophy becomes political and takes the criticism of its own time to its highest point. Utopia does not split off from infinite movement: etymologically it [pg] stands for absolute deterr but always at the critical point at which it is connected with the present relative milieu,
and especially with the forces stifled by this milieu. _Erewhom_, the word used by Samuel Butler, refer not only to no-where but also to now-here. What matters is not the supposed distinction between utopian and scientific socialism but the different types of utopia, one of them being revolution. In utopia (as in philosophy) there is always the risk of a restoration, and sometimes a proud affirmation, of transcendence so that we need to distinguish between authoritarian utopias, or utopias of transcendence, and immanent, revolutionary, libertarian utopias. fn12 [ernst bloch, and a book on fourier] But to say that revolution is itself utopia of immanence is not to say that it is a dream, something that is not realized or that is only realized by betraying itself. On the contrary, it is to posit revolution as plane of immanence, infinite movement and absolute survey, but to the extent that these features connect up with what is real here and now in the struggle against capitalism, relaunching new struggles whenever the earlier one is betrayed. The word utopia therefore designates _that conjunction of philosophy, or of the concept, with the present milieu_ - political philosophy (however, in the view of the mutilated meaning public opinion has given it, perhaps _utopia_ is not the best word.)" [99-100]

--rev is the fault of phil
-even tho both Am and Soviety rev have turned out bad, "does not prevent the concept from pursuing its immanent path"
-rev doesn't exist in a a necessarily rx social field, but in the enthusiasm with whith it is thought on an abs plane of imm (as Kant shows)
-"like a presentation of the in the here and now, which includes nothing rational or even reasonable (fn Kant, then says Fuko, Habermas, Lytoard all pick up on it)

"The concept frees immanence from all the limits still imposed on it by capital (or that is imposed on itself in the form of capital appearing as something transcendent)." [100]

NOT the idealist problem of rev (btwn state of affair and the pure event, etc)
-"as concept and as event, revolution is self-referential or enjoys a self-positing that enables it to be apprehended in an immanent enthusiasm without anything in states of affairs or lived experience being able to tone it down, not even the disappointments of reason. Revolution is absolute deterr even to the point where this calls for a new earth, a new people" [101]

--no deterr w/o reterr
"the concept is not object but territory" "for that very reason it has a past form, a present form and, perhaps, a form to come"
-we always have different planes (germans, from the greeks, from today...)
--historical specificity of planes of imm
--Human Rights, etc

"there is no universal democratic State this movement implies the
particularity of a State, of a right, or of the spirit of a people capable
of expressing human rights in "its" State and of outlining the modern
society of brothers. In fact, it is not only the philosopher, as man, who
has a nation; it is philosophy that is reterr on the national State and the
spirit of the people (usually those of the philosopher, but not always)."

"Thus Nietzsche founded geophilosophy by seeking to determine the national
chatateristics of French, English, and German philosophy. But why were
only three countries collective able to produce phil in the cap world?"
--spain, italy?
--some really reductive readings....

EXAMPLE 8

French personae in phil = "a simple order of reflexive knowledge, an order
of reasons, an "epistemology""
--they are always reterr on consciousness

German - "does not give up the absolute"
--"a mania for founding, for conquering, inspires the philosophy"

England... (pragmatism)
"those nomads who treat the plane of imm as a moveable and moving ground, a
field of radical epxerience, an archipelagian world where they are happy to
pitch their tents from island to island and over the sea. The English
nomadize over the old Greek earth, broken up, fractalized, and extended to
the entire universe. ... for them a tent is all that is needed." [105]

**habit -- creative habit?

END OF EXAMPLE

"If there is no universal democratic State, despite Germany philosophy's
dream of foundation, it is because the market is the only thing that is
universal in capitalism. In contrast with the ancient empires that carried
out transcendent overcodings, capitalism function as an immanent axiomatic
of decoded flows (of money, labor, products). National States are no
longer paradigms of overcoding but constitute the "models of relations" of
this immanent axiomatic. In an axiomatic, models do not refer back to a
transcendence; quite the contrary. It is as if the deterr of States
tempered that of capital and provided it with compensatory reterr. Now,
models of realization may be very diverse (democratic, dictatorial,
totalitarian), they may be really heterogeneous, but they are nonetheless isomorphous with regard to the world market insofar as the latter not only presupposes but produces determinate inequalities of development. That is why, as has often been noted, democratic States are so bound up with, and compromised by, dictatorial States that the defense of human rights must necessarily take up the internal criticism of every democracy. ... [some cultural references I don't get] ... Of course, there is no reason to believe that we can no longer think after Auschwitz, or that we are all responsible for Nazism in an unwholesome culpability that, moreover, would only affects the victims. As Primo Levi said, they will not make us confuse the victims with the executioners. But, [pg] he says, what Nazism and the camps inspire in us is much more or much less: "the shame of being a man" (because even the survivors had to collude, to compromise themselves).fn17 It is not only our States but each of us, every democrat, who finds him or herself not responsible for Nazism but sullied by it. There is indeed catastrophe, but it consists in the society of brothers or friends having undergone such an ordeal that brothers and friends can no longer look at each other, or each at himself, without a "weariness," perhaps a "mistrust," which does not suppress friendship but gives it its modern color and replaces the simple "rivalry" of the Greeks. We are no longer Greeks, and friendship is no longer the same: Blanchot and Mascolo have seen the importance of this mutation for thought itself.

"Human Rights are axioms. They can coexist on the market with many other axioms, notably those concerning the security of property, which are unaware of or suspend them even more than they contradict them: "the impure mixture or the impure side by side," said Nietzsche. Who but the police and armed forces that coexist with democracies can control and manage poverty and the deterr-reterr of shanty towns? What social democracy has not given the order to fire when the poor come out of their territory or ghetto? Rights save neither men nor a philosophy that is reterr on the democratic State. Human rights will not make us bless capitalism."[107] -a knock on consensus and communication...

"Human rights say nothing about the immanent modes of existence of people provided with rights. Nor is it only in the extreme situations [like the Holocaust] described by Primo Levi that we experience the shame of being human. We also experience it in insignificant conditions, before the meanness and vulgarity of existence that haunts democracies, before the propagation of these modes of existence and the thought-for-the-market, and before the values, ideals, and opinions of our time."

"The [pg] ignominy [shame] of the possibilities of life that we are offered appears from within. We do not feel ourselves outside of our time but continue to undergo shameful compromises with it. This feeling of shame is one of philosophy's most powerful motifs. We are not responsible for the victims but responsible before them. And there is no way to escape the
ignoble but to play the part of the animal (to growl, burrow, snigger, distort ourselves): thought itself is sometimes closer to an animal that dies than to a living, even democratic, human being." [107-8]

"We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. The creation of concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist" [108]

"It is not populist writers but the most aristocratic who lay claim to this future. This people and earth will not be found in our democracies. Democracies are majorities, but a becoming is by its nature that which always eludes the majority. The position of many writers with respect to democracy is complex and ambiguous."

A whole section on Heidegger and his Nazism, "he had the wrong people, earth, and blood" ...

MINOR = OPPRESSED! (always on the side of the oppressed)
"For the race summoned forth by art or philosophy is not the one that claims to be pure but rather an oppressed, bastard, lower, anarchical, nomadic, and irremediably minor race" [109]
"_for_ the illiterate ... But what does "for" mean? It is not "for their benefit," or yet "in their place." It is "before." It is a question of becoming. The thinker is not acephalic, aphasic, or illiterate, but becomes so. He becomes Indian, and never stops becoming so - perhaps "so that" the Indian who is himself Indian becomes something else and tears away from his own agony." ... animals....

Becoming is double...
"Becoming is always double, and it is this double becoming that constitutes the people to come and the new earth. The philosopher must become nonphilosopher so that nonphilosophy becomes the earth and people of philosophy." [109]

"The artists or the philosopher is quite incapable of creating a people, each can only summon it with all his strength. A people can only be created in abominable sufferings, and it cannot be concerned any more with art or philosophy. But books of philosophy and works of art also contain their sum of unimaginable sufferings that forewarn of the advent of a people. They have resistance in common - their resistance to death, to servitude, to the intolerable, to shame, and to the present." [110]

Deterr and reterr meet in the double becoming...
"phil is reterr 3 times"
1) on greeks in past
2) on dem st8 in present
3) new people/earth in future
"Greeks and democrats are strangely deformed in this mirror of the future"

Diff btwn utopia, becoming, history and revolution.... [110]

----> experimentation! (which is not history!)

EXAMPLE 9:
Peguy, 2 ways of the event
1) "going over the course of the event, in recording its effectuation in
   history, its conditioning and deterioration in history"
2) "reassembling the event, installing oneself in it as in a becoming,
   becoming young again and aging in it, both at the same time, going through
   all its component or singularities..." everything changes...

****the "Aternal" kinda like untimely or unactual
"acting counter to time, and therefore acting on our time and, let us hope,
for the benefit of a time to come" (the infinite now) -- not an instant but
a becoming...
--what Foucault called Actual? -- archaeology of knowledge 130-1

[[[[the section on the Archive.... dump:

- autonomous level between language (langue) and corpus (collection of words
  spoken) :: "between tradition and oblivion, it reveals the rules of a
  practice that enables statements both to survive and to undergo regular
  modification" [pg 130]

*method stuff -- not possible to describe our own archive
analysis of archive: [pg 131]
-deprives us of our continuities
-dissipates temporal identity
-breaks the thread of transcendental teleologies
-where anthropological thought once questioned man's being or subjectivity,
  it now bursts open the other, and the outside
-not ID via distinction
-"We are difference, that our reason is the difference of discourses, our
  history the differences of times, our selves the difference of masks."
  "difference... is this dispersion that we are and make."]]]]

--Nietzsche inactual?

"not that the actual is the utopian prefiguration of a future that is still
part of history. Rather, it is the now of our becoming."
Foucault on Kant ... "in relation not to the eternal but to the Now, he
means that the object of phil is not to contemplate the eternal or to reflect history but to diagnose our actual becomings: a becoming-revolutionary that, according to Kant himself, is not the same as the past, present, or future of revolutions. A becoming-democratic that is not the same as what States of law are, or even a becoming-Greek that is not the same as what the Greeks were. The _diagnosis_ of becomings in every passing present is what Nietzsche assigned to the philosopher as physician, "physician of civilization," or inventor of new immanent modes of existence. Eternal philosophy, but also the history of philosophy, gives ways to a becoming-philosophical. What becomings pass through us today, which sink back into history, but do not arise from it, or rather that arise from it only to leave it? The Aternal, the Untimely, the Actual are examples of concepts in philosophy; exemplary concepts. And if one calls Actual what the other called Inactual, this is only in virtue of a combination of the concept, in virtue of its proximities and components, the slight displacements of which entail, as Peguy said, the modification of a problem (the Temporally eternal in Peguy, the Eternity of becoming according to Nietzsche, and the Outside-interior with Foucault)" [112-3]

END OF EXAMPLE AND CHAPTER

science chapter ----
opposing phil as infinite speed from sci as a slowing down [118]

--124 -- chains... slowing down
paradigmatic (kuhnian sense)
-serial time

spec diff from phil [125]
(1) plane: consist vs ref
(2) concepts-events-consistence vs. functions/state of affairs-mixtures-ref [126]
(3) mode of enunciation: CP vs. partial observers [129] (both are creative/experimental)

Logic Chapter
mixtures and interaction [153-4]

bodies & actualization [155-7]
-potentia, etc
actualization & counter-actualization [157-61]
- including time

art/affect chapter