

**An
Anti-
sociology**

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What was it that brought a man, one day, to stretch out on the analyst's couch to relate the details of his life? This is in a sense the question Michel Foucault raised in *Madness and Civilization*. In order to solve this problem, Foucault described an historical sequence of three centuries during which time the division separating madness and normality was plotted. The results of his investigation show psychoanalysis to be situated at the outermost point of the confinement trappings without foregoing its fundamental implications: "Freud did deliver the patient from the existence of the asylum within which his 'liberators' had alienated him; but he did not deliver him from what was essential in this existence ... he created the psychoanalytical situation in which, by an inspired short-circuit, alienation becomes disalienation, but the doctor as alienating figure remains the key to psychoanalysis."

Yes, one could tell his life history on the couch. But in such conditions as this, Foucault wonders, what was to be understood? Foucault's impertinent conclusion directed at psychoanalysis was to

please Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari to such an extent that they used it as a starting point for their own book and were able to systematically demolish psychoanalysis, construct a new theory of desire and, while they were at it, sketch the evolution of mankind from its origins to the present day. Each of these three aspects has been spoken about differently. The first aspect has been overly discussed, owing, it would seem, to the book's satirical style aimed at ridiculing psychoanalysis. The second aspect, the theory of machinic desire, has been academically treated so as to ascertain whether it is the negation of any and all poetry, or whether it is nothing but poetry. And the third aspect has been for the most part ignored, which is too bad since here, on the scale of the whole of the human sciences, there is an attempt at subversion on the general order of what Laing and Cooper had carried out solely on the terrain of psychiatry. In Deleuze and Guattari's book, the reversal of psychoanalysis no longer figures as an end in itself, but rather as the primary condition for a shake-up of a completely different scope, whose magnitude is already given in the very form and tone of the book.

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A COMPLEX-FREE DISCOURSE

Some critics have written that this book is difficult. Now, there could not be a more poorly chosen word to designate this outburst of demystification and simplification which traverses in almost constant inflexible fashion the enormous and quite debilitated pile-up constituting the present day intellectual scene.

Anti-Oedipus comes to add to other histories besides the one described by Foucault. For example there is the series of institutional psychotherapy for which the book seeks to be the theoretical expansion. There is also the Freudo-Marxist "tradition" and the anti-Hegelian thrust whose groundwork was laid by Nietzsche. The book is hence the product of a conjunction between different series, a conjunction making for the book's singularity and explaining the kind of welcome it has received: a spectacular success, uneasy, parochial (*poujadistes*) reactions, to put it succinctly. This is due to the fact that, since impossible to situate in a given genre, it shakes the theories of every discipline while the disciplines are unable to summon it before the tribunal of their own rules, since the

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book outflanks them on all sides. It is not a matter, strictly speaking, of a philosophy book; if Deleuze and Guattari indeed have a philosophy, it can adhere totally to the proposition that everything is in everything else and vice versa. Nor does the book emerge from a scientific discipline, any more than it invents one. Its principle of existence can be seen above all in an activity comprising a splitting of instituted modes of knowledge and an integral overturning of institutional propositions currently accepted. Prodigious efforts to think differently.

As concerns the form of the book, it will be recognized as disconcerting. This is because we are no longer accustomed to a book whose absence of disciplinary moorings makes the writing style take on the form of speech. Some deplore the absence here of a linear progression, the absence of the accumulative patience normally gratifying the reader. For Deleuze and Guattari can only be read as one would listen to someone speaking: everything is already said from the first words, all is yet to be said. There is no reason for it to come to a halt, save for fatigue. And it is true that we sometimes find them out of breath, panting too hard to digest the erratic blocks of knowledge acting as stones in the stream of the work, tired out by the rehashings of the primary postulates in order, at every turn, to demonstrate their pertinence. What can be said of all this, except that it is the inevitable ransom of adventure? The flattening of the intellectual scene, by means of a multi-angular scholarship allowing itself to be right to an "indispensable incompetence," is no less disconcerting, as Deleuze and Guattari make negligent use of the most learned and respected scholars, enjoying themselves where they can and nimbly scaling the protective embankments that secure the intellectual edifices and guarantee their prominence. It is no longer a question of being "in the right" with respect to a given discipline or noted author, but rather of saying something which stands by itself.

A style gathering speech up into writing, then, rather than a regulated theoretical production,

discouraging a study of it, as if the desired effect were not so much the contemplation of some body of knowledge as it is the communication of a joyful certitude: the history of humanity is that of a long error that begins with the State and continues with psychoanalysis, via capitalism and the familial system. Another planetary discourse, some will say, but this time at least those "humanistic" fidgetings of nostalgia and prophecy are not present, there is nothing oratorical about *Anti-Oedipus*, no imprecations, no invocations. In order to read this book, and even more so to like it, we must, it is true, share with the authors a certain boredom with tragedy, suspecting it of being nothing more than an exorcism of life, a way of de-realizing history through the calling up of the origins and the incantation of the outcome, cutting off history's flow by means of the rehashings of myth and the compulsion of phantasy. We must also be tired of those entreaties aimed at giving a meaning to life because one is haunted by death. Finally we must be tired of the positivist attempts to obsessively delimit the "pathological" because one fears madness just as one fears all difference. If we are not tired of these things, we will get angry at only finding in its pages an obscuring of painfully acquired certitudes, settlements for the initiated, and a fashionable terrorism.

PSYCHOANALYSIS UPSIDE DOWN

Their enterprise could only be carried out against psychoanalysis, against its sovereign position within the intellectual field, its aptitude for decoding different modes of knowledge while inscribing them in its own wake, all the while constituting the inevitable target for any attempt at seriously shaking up this intellectual field. Now, how could a leftist critique of psychoanalysis be made, when psychoanalysis is justified in its own principles by the relationship of liberation which it maintains with what is driven back or repressed, and when it is powerfully shielded by a technical facade barring access to any and all criticism? The most daring among such projects of critique only scratched the psychoanalytic edifice, fitted it up in slightly different fashion, or annexed it with great reverence and many precautions.

This theoretical and political lock-up relies, as we can now see, on two main allegations which have permitted psychoanalysis to drive back criticism up until now. The first assertion: desire is reactionary in its essence, it does not bear on the present, and even less on the future, but seeks instead a reactivation of the past. From this angle, psychoanalysis passed, if not for revolutionary, at least for honorably progressive since it was coupled with a project of maturation of desire.

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- *The second assumption: desire is a denial of reality since every desire is a desire for images or, what is worse, for images of images.*

The second assumption: desire is a denial of reality since every desire is a desire for images or, what is worse, for images of images. According to this assessment, desire would thus keep us perpetually out of key with respect to the real. Only analysis had competence in this area and was able to make the claim that it could unmask this "impossible real" hidden behind the theater of the Imaginary.

The growing feeling in recent years that things were not running too smoothly in the area of psychoanalysis constantly ran up against the above argument. Deleuze and Guattari move from this to an extremely coherent attitude stating that what cannot be assimilated or reshaped must be overthrown without another word being wasted on it. To the assertion that desire is de-realizing they retort that desire is the real itself, Why, they ask, see anything other than a difference in régime between desiring activity and social, technical, artistic or political activity? Surely there can be a reactionary desire, but desire is in its essence revolutionary – take Fourier for example. This veritable reversion of psychoanalysis is carried out thanks to three operations:

1. A generalization of the unconscious. — Once it has been detriangularized, relativized, the unconscious becomes the continuum of existence, its principle, and no longer one impetus among others. The unconscious, an orphan, self-produced, anarchist and atheist, cyclical, enveloping within its own experience that of death, makes Becoming into something which does not stop and which never stops recurring. It therefore knows nothing of the origin or the end of existence, it expresses nothing and is not even a

language. It is not the secret repository of a meaning to be deciphered, but rather *the state of coexistence of man and nature*.

2. A materialization of desire. — Desire is no longer viewed as a desire *for* something; it is not a tension exerted toward an object that is lacking and which is always lacking in order for desire, transcendence and beliefs to live; it is not produced by an incompleteness, but is, precisely, a production working by means of an association between machines that produce flows and other machines which break these flows: the sun and the eyes, the air and the mouth, the sexual organ and anything else you want. Desire back on its feet consists of a swarming of connections between energy-machines and organ-machines, and which can incidentally be both at the same time. Process thus implies neither law, hierarchy, nor transgression. The extension of sexuality to all surfaces of contact is obviously not what makes this analysis new-here Freud already pointed the way; what makes it different is the simultaneous desubstantialization and demystification of sexuality, such that desire no longer has a precise substance or a meaning. There is no longer a myth, an archetype or a structure which could be related back to the drives, and vice versa, in a give-and-take guaranteeing sexuality as an underground force and the force of myths. The shattering of this link holding together myth and sexuality liberates *desire as a surface activity*, and relieves it of the character of canned tragedy vile to the taste-buds.

3. A functionalization of the processes of attraction and repulsion. — Death is not the object of desire, but a form of desire, "a part of the desiring-machine, a part which must itself be judged, evaluated in the functioning of the machine and the system of its energetic conversions, and not as an abstract principle." Just as there is life which desires in terms of the body without organs, this state of catatonic immobility of the body which silences organs and repudiates them. The difference between Deleuze and Guattari's analysis here, and psychoanalysis, is that we are no longer captive to a dualistic concept of the instincts, a dilemma approving of civilization at every turn and sanctioning the repressive agencies as alone capable of combatting the death instinct. Instead we have at our disposal the possibility of *understanding the life-death, attraction-repulsion relationships in terms of a positive conjugation*. No longer an antagonistic dualism which would

be overcome dialectically through a neutralization by the Oedipal filter, but a functional multiplicity where the repulsion of the organs by the body without organs conditions the attraction which is the functioning in and of itself. If repulsion is indispensable this is due to the fact that, without it, a fixed organism is created, a closed entity, finalized, blocking the free labor of the molecular set-up of the desiring-machines which cannot function without some failures and breakdowns, hence without returns to a zero degree, by means of a kind of entropy, in order to be once again reactivated: a cycle during which the model of death (the body without organs-the death that comes from within) is converted into the experience of death (the death which comes from without).

In this ontogenetic perspective, the body without organs figures as the third term in the productive series: 1) flow; 2) cut; 3) stoppage. It is in relation to this third movement, that of anti-production, that the possible variations of desire are defined. The paranoid state corresponds to a situation wherein the desiring-machines persecute the body without organs: the repudiation of desire. The schizophrenic state stands at the other pole of the process and is an enchantment of the body without organs which miraculously takes on all of the productive forces and the organs of production.

These differentiations cannot be fully understood except within the phylogenetic perspective that aligns the different stages of history. At this level, generic production functions according to the same plan, with anti-production being represented successively by the Earth, the Despot, and Capital. There is, however, a major difference between the body without organs and the general forms of anti-production; the body without organs is the internal result of desiring-production over which it exercises functional primary repression, whereas the general forms of anti-production are desiring-production's extrinsic condition and exercise an arbitrary social repression over it.

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The evolution of history attests then to an ever greater liberation of flows (a schizophrenization), a tendency which the agencies of anti-production provoke while at the same time trying to contain these flows, map them back onto themselves, and join them all (paranoia). The historical process therefore tends to do one of two things: make the earth an equivalent of the body-without organs; or 'solidify the whole of desiring-production into a mass and rigidify it into meta-organisms, pseudo-worlds, the hidden face of the earth.

Do all of these new operations, these new "pieces of evidence" put forth in the book, open a final refutation of psychoanalysis? Or is it merely a question of a contribution, certainly a bit too vigorous, but nonetheless assimilable by psychoanalysis? In order to decide on this, we must look at how psychoanalysis, before arriving at the point it presently occupies, had to undergo the consecutive modifications brought about following two decisive confrontations: a confrontation with the reality of the psychiatric hospital on the one hand, and with Nietzschean thought on the other.

The first confrontation was led under the name of institutional psychotherapy. Analytic practice met up with what it had always been able to avoid in its "liberal" practice: the treatment of the psychoses which it hypocritically left up to psychiatrists. The unwillingness of psychotics to enter into analysis, the impossibility of making the psychotic delirium enter into the Freudian frameworks of interpretation, were both experienced by Guattari from 1956 on, beginning with his first hospital psychotherapy. From the published account of this we can witness a curious

wavering between the not too discreet pleas made to his patient so that the latter would recite "daddy, mommy, my sickness and me" and a growing attention to a discourse inclined to speak of something else altogether; of Kafka, of the Jews, or of an integral immobility. We can also see that the injection of a psychoanalytic discourse, the Lacanian version, into a custodial institution provoked a kind of collectivization of the analytic concepts: transferences became institutional and phantasies collective. This consideration of desire on a collective level fulfilled a political function in the sixties: for those sickened by Stalinism in all its forms, La Borde became a refuge, the place for a critique of militant practice and social theory; Lacan was still spouted out, but it was already a matter of something entirely different.

The second confrontation, with Nietzschean thought, was the encounter between Deleuze and Guattari. This encounter led to a mutual call for an integral, amoral theory of history and a theory of desire freed from all moorings in the sphere of the pathological, the establishment of a correspondence between an evaluation of behavior and actions with no other criteria than their own force and a perception of desire calling only for desire's self-sufficiency. This encounter was the occasion for a clarification of everything that had just resurfaced within the framework of institutional psychotherapy: the teachings pertaining to a machinic functioning of desire, and to a cathexis by desire of the entire social field, are drawn from the psychotic, all of this witnessed in his delirium; from group practice the idea is extracted that the creative constructs, the real singularities are the desiring micro-multiplicities, subject-groups, and not persons or institutions. Political analysis comes to coincide completely with the analysis of the cathexes of desire. What was an external critique of political theory and practice becomes an integral part of this new analysis, since the distinction can no longer be made between a social logic (meta-individual) and a logic of desire (intra-individual), between a reality principle and a pleasure principle.

On the whole, then, schizoanalysis is a theory constructed on the basis of everything that psychoanalysis hid from view or neglected: psychosis and the social cathexes of desire; not in the least in order to violently force them into the analytic edifice, but rather so as to explode this edifice and open the analysis of desire to the social field.

THE END OF FREUDO-MARXISM

But, one might quickly ask, isn't this effacement of the rigid distinction between the reality principle and the pleasure principle already an old dream, the dream behind all the attempts at synthesis of Marx and Freud? And besides, doesn't this liquidation of the barrier between the theory of the unconscious and social theory lead us to the same sort of aberrations we reproached psychoanalysis for above: an imperialism of the theory of the unconscious which subjugates all the other dimensions? Why, in the last analysis, prefer Deleuze and Guattari's anthropology to the anthropologies sought in close allegiance with Lacanian orthodoxy?

An attempt at specifying the position of *Anti-Oedipus* in relation to all of these questions is all the more necessary in that its appearance is more or less contemporary with two equally important books which take appreciably different positions on these questions. The first book, published right before *Anti-Oedipus*, entitled *La critique de l'economie politique du signe* by Jean Baudrillard, is a critique of Marx's critique. This book's political point of view is no less radical than Deleuze and Guattari's, but it is based on a theory of the unconscious very close to that of Lacan. The second book, *Le psychanalisme*, by Robert Castel, appeared several months later. It is a total denunciation of all of the illusions held by psychoanalysis with regard to its political scope, both in the practice of its agents as well as in the attempts at reaching a synthesis with social theories.

"It seems to us that one has yet to analyze the role and the effects of this **contractual model** which psychoanalysis has come to follow ... (the psychoanalytic contract as a particular case of the medico-liberal contractual relationship)," writes Deleuze in his preface to Guattari's *Psychanalyse et transversalite*. It can now be said that **this has been done in Castel's book**. The analytical contract provides the means for "placing the political and social determinations aside from the very moment and at the very level of the foundation of the analysis, its development (the dual relation), its materials (the formations of the unconscious), and its concepts (the categories of the analytic discourse)." The contract is thus an arbitrary convention for gaining a certain access to the unconscious which is completely caught in a bias with respect to reality; a bias having to do with procedures of neutralization of what, in real life, is never neutral. By means of this preliminary neutralization, psychoanalysis in fact becomes *neutralizing*, it neutralizes what it expels through the use of the contract but subtly continues in its own

practice: the role of money, the structures of inequality, the reference to the family, the leading role attributed to masculine symbols, etc.... From this there results the impossibility of accrediting psychoanalysis with any subversive content whatever since this structuration of its practice and its theory on the contrary provides the key to a normalizing imperialism which is manifest in the new capacities of intervention which it grants to the "mental" medicine apparatus. The natural movement of **psychoanalysis** in its *formal* and *exterior* critique of psychiatry has above all led psychoanalysis to be extended beyond the hospital, with the cooperation of the hospital, to be **metamorphosed and multiplied rather than really changed** (unlike the strategy adopted by people like Guattari who, as we have seen, led a *practical* critique of psychoanalysis by introducing it by force into the hospital; but here we have left Castel's line of argument, for he does not think too highly of institutional psychotherapy).

It is within this direction of an accrued medicalization of the social problems by means of psychoanalysis itself, that the whole of the Freudo-Marxist attempts at analysis appear to Castel as the means for finding a medical explanation and solution for revolutionary failures. Even if these attempts condemn loudly and strongly the practical extension of bourgeois or revisionist psychoanalysis, they participate in the same process which consists in seeking to "cure life" while believing to "change" it...

Castel's description now enables us to look in depth at fifty years of liaison between Marxism and psychoanalysis, and to thereby explain its breaking point where Baudrillard as well as Deleuze and Guattari are situated. This liaison begins with the Marxists and the Freudians at loggerheads with one another. The Soviets have Pavlov, the Americans will have Freud; **Stalin, by the way, prefers, adores stimuli.** The only Communist who was also a psychoanalyst, Wilhelm Reich, was incapable of being both until 1932 (with respect to the C. P.) and 1934 (with respect to psychoanalysis, a point, nonetheless). It was the socio-democrats, the Germans of the Frankfurt School whence Marcuse stems, who had the task of leading the confrontation between Marx and Freud. What Reich and Marcuse did was to make a certain number of adjustments of Marxism and of psychoanalysis, postulating their fundamental compatibility. An ingenious bit of handiwork, but carried out blindly; a kind of intellectual forcing of the issue which neglected what was to become the main question: the heterogeneity of the conditions of production for Marxist theory and for Freudian theory. With Althusser and Lacan handiwork and amalgams are finished. They instituted the pure,

rigid rule of epistemology, i.e., the reign of truisms and tautologies: Marxism is Marx; Freudianism is Freud; science is science. It was nevertheless not deemed impossible to join the two orders of knowledge if one proceeded with all due respect. Certain critics have devoted many pages of rare intelligence and total futility in order to show that the Freudian sub-continent could, while maintaining its dignity, take its place within the large Marxist -Leninist continent.

During the first period of this confrontation, the efforts bore in a sense on finished products, on a reality cut up, filtered through and treated by different cognitive methods. In the second period, a relationship was established

due to the simple similarity of methods based on the same practice of suspicion. The first was fertile but, might we add, artificial; the second engaged in no denaturizing procedures, but at the price of sterility. This perhaps enables us to

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understand how it was that one could no longer advance in this direction except by practicing an underhanded or straightforward abolition of one term or the other in the problematic. What could not be established by means of a mutual dismantling of the respective domains, and even less so by a methodological closeness, was now sought in the simplest way possible: by settling accounts either with psychoanalysis or with Marxism. We will say then that Deleuze and Guattari's enterprise is a hyper-Marxism whereas Baudrillard's could be termed hyper-Freudian. This can be established by considering the place occupied by production in Deleuze and Guattari, and by exchange in Baudrillard.

Since desire for Deleuze and Guattari is production, every production can be confronted with desiring-production; a connection which the psychiatric and psychoanalytic apparatus is bent on proscribing by referring desire not to production but to the Law, by relating not to the social and political space but to the petty enclave of the family. In Deleuze and Guattari, desire then takes its place in the Marxist constellation of the productive forces. It is only repressed and regulated by that which regulates all production.

Baudrillard represents for us the paradoxical man who carries out one of the best critiques of Marx, while weeding out all of the naturalist naïvetés, but who cannot see a half-naked woman without thinking that the limit where clothing meets naked flesh figures as the cut-off point of castration.

For Baudrillard the concept of exchange is the focal point starting from which he effects an absolute deconstruction of Marxism and comes to anchor his theory in Freudianism, the Lacanian version. First then, this implies a critique of Marxism starting from a refusal of the distinction between use-value and exchange-value. Use-value relies on an idealist anthropology giving credit to the idea of a nature, natural needs, the idea of a utility which escapes historical determinism. Now, needs are regulated by a code, by a system whose logic is as abstract as that which regulates the equivalence of exchange-value. The same abstraction, hence the same fetishism of commodities in the framework of use-value as in the framework of exchange-value.

The second stage of Baudrillard's critique: to this supremacy of the logic of equivalence corresponds the logic of the signifier, with the signified being the needs, the use-value. A hierarchized bi-polarity where absolute preeminence is attributed to exchange-value and to the signifier. And since the stroke separating the signifier and the signified is the stroke of castration, and since the unconscious is structured like a language, one arrives at the foregone conclusions arrived at already by Lacan. Baudrillard represents for us the paradoxical man who carries out one of the best critiques of Marx, while weeding out all of the naturalist naïvetés, but who cannot see a half-naked woman without thinking that the limit where clothing meets naked flesh figures as the cut-off point of castration.

For Baudrillard the modern unconscious, perfused by equivalence, is the plaything of systems, the slave of signs. Capitalism is the progressive dismantling of the unconscious domains which leads to substituting for the

veritable logic of desire and for its radical ambivalence, the principle of equivalence by means of which there are no longer more than pseudo-exchanges, the manipulation of signs of enjoyment in the place of enjoyment itself. One no longer exchanges anything more than simulacra, one no longer enjoys, one consumes signs.

This analysis has all the essentials to lure us with, except that it ends by separating desire from all social economy. Hence it institutes a closed system to which death can only come from outside. One spends one's time verifying the law of equivalence, de mystifying all its progressions and waiting for desire to want to make its eruption. Graver still, one might wonder: how is this system maintained? Since the product of a dismantling process, it implies the necessary elements to maintain its artificiality, ramparts able to contain within their limits the ambivalence of desire. Hence the reason for cops, teachers, armies we are told. But how does it work? How is it efficient? Merely by its force? To the exteriority of desire corresponds the exteriority of repression. Therefore there is, on the one side, an exchangeist system whose inscription in the unconscious entails a capacity for generalized recuperation of any and all excesses and then, nevertheless, but quite foreign to this logic, a capacity for repression.

The difficulty is clear: Baudrillard says: 1) there is only exchange; 2) an objective repression is nevertheless necessary; 3) this repression is in no way based on the driving elements of the psyche, it is the barbed wire cutting off a closed area.

The force of Deleuze and Guattari's book lies precisely in seeking the processes which link repression to self-repression. The absence of any distinction in nature between social production and desiring-production allows them to inscribe the logic of desire at the heart of the capitalist system, to see therein a force whose development is simultaneous with the development of the whole of the productions, a force overlapping these productions and menacing the social relationships in which this generic production is contained. We can follow the reasoning: everything takes place as if Deleuze and Guattari had said to themselves: Marxism is fine, its way of putting matter there where one had seen the spirit

or some strange substance. But why in hell did Marx stop when he was on such a good path? Desire merited the same treatment as the other phenomena. With this omission having been made, it is not at all surprising if the Marxist method only permits understanding things half way, with ups and downs and even more annoying turns of the crank. Let's be more Marxist than Marx. Let's go all the way. We will also do a materialist analysis of desire, hence lodging it well within the foundations of the social system. And if Marxism falls apart as a result of this, it deserved it.

Capitalism's weakness, for Deleuze and Guattari, is therefore to be found in what it *implies*, i.e., an inevitable development of desiring-production, and it is therefore not to be found in what it *excludes*, i.e., the primitive symbolic exchange, as Baudrillard would have it. Change for Deleuze and Guattari derives from *the* very logic of the development, whereas for Baudrillard it is subordinated in a sense to the return of the repressed. Repression consists, for Baudrillard, in the absolute separation between veritable desire and social life, in the conversion of the one into the other by means of a trick which Freud termed sublimation and which Baudrillard describes as the substitution of the logic of equivalence (the level of capitalist merchandise) for the logic of ambivalence (the logic of desire and of the symbolic exchange). For Deleuze and Guattari repression is inseparable from the self-repression proper to the logic of capitalism, which can only exist by liberating generic production while at the same time containing it within well-deformed limits so that it doesn't flee in all directions and escape everywhere. Repression is therefore not an *exterior* condition of capitalism, but rather its *internal* contradiction. The fundamental question raised by *Anti-Oedipus* is therefore the following: if capitalism is all the more powerful to the extent that it liberates more production and hence more desire, how does it manage to maintain itself? They take into account the fact that it does not suffice to say

that it so manages by means of repression but that we must explain how this repression is possible, what relationships there are between its efficacy and desire.

What we have attempted to situate through this comparative discussion of the three works by Castel, Baudrillard and Deleuze and Guattari is a kind of gradation in the urgency of the question bearing on the problem of power in its relations to desire, a progressive escalation towards what is perhaps most bothersome to think of. Castel describes psychoanalysis as a practico-theoretical complex whose function it is to mask the real problems which are, as Marxism demands, ~~man's~~ production of ~~his~~ material life. His critique of power is undertaken in terms of true and false, good and evil; this is what we term humanism. As for Baudrillard, he develops a critique of capitalism considered as a system of illusions artificially sustained through a repression which is useless to criticize morally or cleverly since this repression find its principle within itself. This is the paradox of nihilism: we live so much in illusions that we cannot disengage ourselves from our subjugation to the power that is exterior to us, the only objective reality. For Deleuze and Guattari the problem is not to criticize power, nor to name it, but to perceive the active links it upholds with what is its own negation: desire.

In the second place we can notice how in this gradation, if one prefers, this span, the attention given to the problem of illness on the one hand and the reference, if not the reverence with respect to the established modes of knowledge on the other, diminish as we approach a problematic connecting desire and power. In any case we could deduce from this that what is called realism is a consideration of institutions and people in the name of their knowledge at least as much as a consideration of the sufferings of this world. That ought to suffice to force attention on *Anti-Oedipus*, for there are more and more people becoming indifferent to the clinical and the human sciences and who feel that these modes of knowledge are getting them nowhere. It is only too obvious that they are becoming more and more congested, having attained a saturation point that invalidates their postulate and reveals their political limitations. We could care less whether, with these modes of institutional knowledge, optimism or pessimism were fabricated, state Deleuze and Guattari. What we are looking for, what we want, are new analyses, new means.

AN ANTISOCIOLOGY

Now, the means are provided in *Anti-Oedipus* for escaping from at least three of the major difficulties of current forms of social analysis:

1) The alternative between functionalist descriptions which do no more than rationalize "after the fact," and very poorly indeed, the social institutions, and structuralist analysis which denounces, according to acknowledged uses, mechanisms of functioning that contradict these uses. If this latter form of analysis has more often than not a revolutionary orientation, it is at the price of a unilateral view of systems which does not provide an understanding of the forces which labor and are at work in the said institutions.

2) The whole gamut of distinctions between infra and superstructure, between class struggle and marginal struggles. Classical Marxist analysis consists in extracting the pure gold of class struggle from the matrix of the concrete. But since class struggle in a pure state is quite rare, if not indeed non-existent, it becomes unnecessary to join to class struggle a religious, linguistic, or ethnic dimension operating' as more or less disruptive parameters. Having played down everything that does not come out of pure Marxist logic, and having merely analyzed the nature of struggles, it was forgotten that struggles also have a definite space and a definite direction and that these three elements are inseparable. There is no social construction which is not first of all a certain form of investment of the earth, a certain manner for inhabiting it.

3) The more or less chaste veil thrown over the problem of the State. It is ever more impossible to see in the State the simple instrumental secretion of a partisan or collective will, whereas one establishes everywhere its aptitude for subordinating the revolutionary movements, its ever greater attraction towards regressive temptations.

In order to escape from all these difficulties, the very type of questioning must be changed. We must no longer ask: what is society? This is an abstract idea, merely serving to open the way for the most general of concepts. Instead we must substitute for this the direct question: how do we live in Society? This is a concrete question entailing others in its wake: where do we live? how do we inhabit the earth? how do we live and experience the State? In such a way that the social processes no longer look to these questions so much for an explanation of the terms of their internal logic, but rather this

questioning is done in terms of the investments with which these processes affect the two surfaces surrounding them: **the earth and the State**. The social is no longer an autonomous whole but a field of variations situated between an impetus of aggregation and a surface on which flows of all sorts wander.

1. Molar, molecular, gregarity. In their attempts to bypass the alternative between function and structure, Deleuze and Guattari rely explicitly on the trend of critical psycho-sociology which developed in France after the Algerian War and whose fecundity in terms of historical analysis was demonstrated by Sartre in *La Critique de la raison dialectique*.

We can find more than one correspondence between Sartre's "group-infusion" and the molecular formations of Deleuze and Guattari, the desiring micro-multiplicities which constitute the active pole of the social constellations. We can also find similarities between the latter's molar constellations and Sartre's serial gatherings. But the first important difference is that, for Deleuze and Guattari, there does not exist a separation between the molar and the molecular. Now Sartre described these forms more as *successive* states in the life of a group. As for Deleuze and Guattari, they stick to defining the coexistence of these different states, and locating which line subordinates the other. This is in fact the whole task of schizoanalysis, this work of detection:

1) To discover at the heart of the social molar machines the presence of desiring-machines and the variations of affinity between the two. Hence a primary mechanic's task aimed at studying the incompatibilities in functioning, the immobilizations, by confronting desiring-machines and molar machines.

2) To distinguish the pre-conscious cathexes of interest. The molar constellations are not pure inertia, but are constituted by the social investments. The attachment to a social class refers back to one's role in production or anti-production. There is thus a cathexis of interest which bears on the regime of social syntheses according to the place one occupies within the apparatus. But this cathexis is distinct from the libidinal cathexis which can lead just as easily to the desire for a new social body as to the social body in existence. This is an important distinction because the two types of cathexis can be opposed, feeding the contradictions both in the dominant class and in the dominated strata of society.

The second advantage of referring the study of groups to desiring-production is that in this way one avoids the need for founding historicity on the speculation of an original lack. The cyclical nature of Sartre's description of the life of groups implied a kind of compulsive mechanics: groups repeatedly and successively snatched from inertia thanks to a dynamics of rarity placed at the threshold of history, and always followed by fatal relapses into the "practico-inert" until the reign of abundance arrives. Thus Sartre was incapable of describing the social constellations on the whole except as inert constructs, petrified practices traversed by spasmodic waves. Deleuze and Guattari escape from this relentless dialectic by conferring on each pole, the molar and the molecular, its own attraction: the schizophrenic pole (molecular) corresponding to productive desire, the paranoiac pole to the adjustment of a lack. On the one side desire is seized within the real order of its production, which therefore behaves like a molecular phenomenon devoid of goals or intentions; on the other side, desire is the prisoner of large "totalizing, signifying objectivities which situate the organizations, the lacks and the goals."

The large social formations are qualified as **gregarious** because they gather together all of their elements by crushing, through selective pressure, all of the singularities and multiplicities, thereby producing a structural unity. This unity gains its efficiency from effecting a fusion of desire and lack, assigning to desire an end, goal, needs, and intentions within its deployment. Lack is not at the origin of desire but rather constituted by the apparatus which recovers and registers the productions. Capitalist society has as its main characteristic that of pushing the liberation of flows to its extreme point, all the while maintaining them within limits which permit their inscription; hence there is an encouraged tendency towards schizophrenization, towards the absolute liberation of flows, towards their endless escape from social codes and territories; but there is also an aggravated tendency towards reconnection, towards the subjugation to the structure which assigns the production a place and a limit.

Function and structure are not to be opposed as differing methods of analysis, they are merely two different regimes of one and the same production, but their difference has now been carried to the point of explosion. And what is at issue in this struggle is the form of investment which the earth can assume.

2. Territoriality. — In our mind, this is the richest idea in the book. While we can see that it takes a lot of things into account and permits doing away with the distinctions between infra- and super-structural, between what is marginal and what is essential, we also recognize that it is rarely and barely explained.

In a first attempt at definition of what they mean by territoriality we might do well to refer to the notion of codes. Coding and territorialization are two complementary modalities for the fitting-up of productions. Coding adjusts the production to the *socius*, the central apparatus of society, and territorialization stocks the flows of production on the body of the earth. If we consider the "savage" societies the difference is negligible between coding and territorialization, since the recording surface and the coding space are both the earth itself. The earth is then "this great unengendered stasis, the superior element of production which conditions the common appropriation and utilization of the soil." It is on the earth that the tie is made between desire and its own repression. It is the space, the object and the natural grounding of production, the immanent form of the first cathexis of desire bearing on the full body of the earth, only modulated then by sole differences in intensity. This is to say that the establishment of a principle of geographic distribution is already a first stage of deterritorialization since it institutes a divided, parceled earth, replaced as a unifying principle by a transcendent agency this time, the unity of the State, the new full body. It can be seen that coding and territoriality evolve in inverse proportion to one another. When coding is developed, becoming overcoding, territoriality diminishes and gains in artificiality. Desire no longer bears directly on the earth, it no longer inhabits it. Desire now hallucinates the earth through new full bodies: God, Moses, little and big chiefs; lead us to the Promised Land!

This movement of deterritorialization is raised to such a level by

It is only through the total liberation of the flows that one might hope for the re-creation of a new earth.

the logic of capitalism that it can no longer be produced except by simultaneously carrying out reterritorializations that feverishly call to arms all the former ones. This is carried all the way to the saturation point making of capitalism, according to Nietzsche, "the motley painting of all that has ever been believed." The activity of coding, pushed, to its extreme limit, becomes the axiomatic, the regulation of the flows which regulates them without ever rigidifying or immobilizing them. Properly speaking, there is no longer territoriality, but a state of suspension of the flows that must render them permanently available, whence this ceaseless back-and-forth movement of deterritorializations and reterritorializations. It is only through the total liberation of the flows that one might hope for the re-creation of a new earth. Homecomings, but without an umbilical cord this time, as supple and functional as the body without organs for the schizophrenic; a miraculated earth capable of containing the proliferation of the productions, an enchanted surface where the flows will be able to shift about endlessly.

This is more than mere literature, for this entire description is supported by a critique of representation which comes to serve as the basis for their analysis of territoriality. Delimiting a territory, marking out its limits, taking account of its resources, attributing a Center to it, amounts to representing it, leaving the surface of the earth in order to enter into the sphere of representation. Maps and charts also constitute the territory. These two things are inseparable: the relinquishing by the earth of its primary privilege, and the advent of pseudo-

worlds, those of the territory and the despot, those related in myths and in tragedy; the apparition of another face of the earth, shabby as pasteboard, limited as a theater stage.

It is in this fashion that the major objective representations transport desire into the symbolics of representation, at the same time relating it back to material conditions: a precise space, the body of the despot. Following these objective representations there are the subjective representations, real conversions of the former ones which, by displacing myths and tragedies from the social space towards subjectivity, transform these into dreams and phantasies. This operation increases the potency of these dreams and phantasies, by lodging them in interiority. The closed world of representation gives way to the figures of a universal libido. A subjective representation of desire in the privatized family and a subjective representation of labor in private property. There is nothing left but daddy-mommy, money and shit. There are thus not two distinct levels, the level of the subjective and the level of the objective, that of the ideological and that of the Real. Instead there is one and the same phenomenon of creation of a perverted and neurotic universe.

One might be tempted to totally agree with Deleuze and Guattari if it were not for the fact that there is a rather unfortunate lack of an analysis of the effects of this movement of de territorialization on the very body of the earth itself. How, through what means, is this de territorialization carried out if not by means of an equivalent process of deterioration of this earth? If the capitalist economy is indeed a war economy, only able to proceed by an always more advanced and intense colonization of terrestrial space, it must be recognized that this economy implies an administration of the prospective terror which radically modifies this space. In order to make fear reign a space of fear must be created; the earth must therefore be rendered uninhabitable. The appearance of habitats was a defense, a first form of resistance to colonization. Their current destruction no longer leaves them with more than their function as a refuge, a hiding place. Now, it is not solely by means of "flows of stupidity" that the State produces this fear with regard to space, but by rendering space truly, biologically uninhabitable. In Deleuze and Guattari's critique of representation there is a chunk of reality which is left out.

Agreed, Deleuze and Guattari might well reply, and so if we are not able to create a new world, the liberated flows will lead us towards another one. While waiting for this to happen, it is not on the side of the schizo that the apocalypse is to be found, but well within the hands of the State, and if necessary, their analysis of this situation would be able to convince us on this matter.ⁿ¹

3. The origins of the family, of paranoia and the State. — *Anti-Oedipus* contains

all that is needed for a reversal of Engels' propositions in *The Origins of the Family*. Let's recall to mind that he established the State and the family in a relationship that could be deduced from the modification of the relationships of production whose essential axis was the advent of private property. The State possessed three characteristics for Engels: its birth was logical, it was determined before being determining, and there were as many forms of States as there were modes of production. The family, from a position integrated within the relationships of production in an original era, became progressively individualized but still remained closely subordinated to and alienated by private property, with private property being the major "analyzer" of the other institutions. To which Deleuze and Guattari respond: The birth of the State is not logical but perfectly contingent; the fact of the founders of the State, "they (who) come like fate, without reason, consideration or pretext."ⁿ² Where do they come from? from the desert, i.e., from the limit exterior to the discontinuous web of filiations and alliances which stowed among themselves and on the full body of the earth the savage populations. What do they bring with them? the principle of a vertical allegiance to the despot, a new point of coupling of the alliances and the filiations which the despot extends by causing them to converge in his direct filiation with God. The despot then replaces the earth as an immobile motor, his God is the Goddess Earth. Secondly, the State is a determining factor before being determined. The despotic machine installs an overcoding on the first assemblies, thereby determining a unified construct. The territorial machine held its own through an interplay of actions and reactions articulated around debt. It fit together the filiations in themselves and among themselves, the producers and the non-producers according to a relationship of debtor

Capital no longer maintains anything, it must on the contrary maintain the flows at a certain level of decoding. Neither too much, nor too little.

and creditor which marked on the very body of each organ the place, the function and the use to which it was indebted. The overcoding, in establishing the law as a superior unity, substituted for this active scheme the passivity of terror, the abstract sign for the concrete marking of the body. The law is a latency, the omnipresent menace of everything that might escape it. The law no longer manages a system of retribution and re-equilibration but allows the State to drain everything towards itself by the capitalization of debt that it renders infinite, eternal. The state is the already-there, the thing to which everything is owed.

The deterritorialization of the soil (by privatization) and the deterritorialization of wealth (by a monetary abstraction), the decoding of the flows (the monetary flows, the commercial flows, the flows of man-power); this hazardous conjunction of production and of capital, rendered possible in this way, brings about a displacement of the position of the State which, from a determining position, becomes determined. Its role is no longer that of direction but of regulation, of surveillance, and of control of the processes of deterritorialization and of reterritorialization of the flows in order that they be able to connect to capital, but without ever escaping from it. Capital no longer maintains anything, it must on the contrary maintain the flows at a certain level of decoding. Neither too much, nor too little.

Deleuze and Guattari's third response to Engels is that there has never been but one State. From Engels' art of the happy medium it might be deduced that the State is the wisdom of nations whereas it is their dark folly. "Born from decoding and deterritorialization, on the ruins of the despotic machine, the modern societies are caught between the *Urstaat* which they would indeed like to resuscitate as an overcoding and

reterritorializing unity, and the freed flows leading them towards an absolute threshold." If this nostalgia for the *Urstaat* carries so much weight, it is due to the fact, as Reich already put forth, that it is desired. But how can one desire the State? How can desire desire its own repression? The answer is found in the analysis of the evolution of the family.

In the primitive social machine, the family is not isolated by any sort of barrier from the rest of the social and political field. Producing and non-producing elements are immediately marked, inscribed on the *socius*, according to their family rank and their rank in the family. This is exactly what Engels said, and he is certainly right when he makes the advent of private property the principal cause of the privatization of the family; but if he does indeed see the cause of the process, he is hardly aware of its scope.

What is inscribed within the capitalist *socius* are no longer producers but forces and means of production as abstract quantities. Whence a placing out of play of the family, a segregation making it the locale for an abstract equality. The family becomes, then, a deceptive microcosm of what it is separated from, a surface of application of the social field which, while fitting itself over the familial determinations, performs a transmutation of social persons into private persons and vice versa. As the smallest possible theater, the smallest colony of capitalism, the family causes the entire social field to pass into the images of private life. "In the aggregate of departure there is the boss, the tribal chief, the priest, the cop, the tax-collector, the soldier, the worker, all of the machines and the territorialities, all of the social images of our society, but in the aggregate of destination, there no longer exists anything more than daddy-mommy-me." The family only expresses what it no longer dominates and this simulation of the social field allows the latter to catch desire in the trap of its primary cathexes and to draw the maximum benefits from the very process of making desire guilty. Daddy, mommy, my desire and me, everywhere and forever.

This operation completes the adventure of desire, its migration from the primary situation where it was a simple effusion, a "germinal implex" running on the surface of the body of the earth, unaware of incest since the pure filiations did not presuppose names or functions that were discernible, but simple differences in intensity. Oedipus is born when society gains in extension what it loses in intensity.

The prohibition therefore bears nominally on incest, but what it represses is the unbridling of the free flows on the body of the earth. Oedipus is not the object of desire but desire's repressing representation. Desire is shamed when it is granted as its object what is forbidden it. Whatever you desire is, therefore, what is shameful. The first trickery from whence the others derive. The despotic State symbolically embodies Oedipus through the ritual incest of the sovereign, a displacement that transports Oedipus to the point of an object on high, increasing its importance, situating desire even better on it, since *it* is the act that determines sovereignty and forbids access to it. In the final stage, Oedipus is installed in familial life, becoming the representative of desire, the imaginary object and no longer the symbolics of its repression. What is inaccessible is no longer outside but in the very heart of being. Fear and shame freeze desire there, in an "upright stance."

Between the family and the State, there exists a constituent link causing them to call upon each other. Behind daddy-mommy, the State. The State which makes way for the family and prepares for it, the State which is the family's horizon. And this is all achieved by means of a ruse causing the prohibition to be taken as the object of desire. History did not begin in the head of the children who desired the father's place, but in the fear of the father, who says: "What you desire is my death." Oedipus is a paranoiac's idea. Through it the family is more than alienated, it is alienating.

1. This remark was inspired by Paul Virilio's article "L'Etat suicidaire" (*Cause commune*, #3), whose confrontation with this aspect of *Anti-Oedipus* might engender a myriad of reflections and great perplexity.

2. *Nietzsche On the Genealogy of Morals*, II, section 17. [translator's note].

"Une anti-sociologie," *Esprit*, December 1972. *Translated by Mark Seem.*